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DEMOCRACY AND THE
NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISRAEL
Michael Mandel*
Democracy and the New Constitutionalism
In a recent paper, I argue that the "new constitutionalism" - the
transformation in the relations between courts and representative in-
stitutions that has swept the world and that is now sweeping Israel too
- can best be understood as one of those "changes of everything so that
everything would remain the same".' The promotion of courts and the
demotion of legislatures through the judicial enforcement of "rigid"
Charters and Bills of Rights has "legalized politics," changing its nature
as well as its locus. Contrary to those who regard this as an essentially
democratic development, I argue that it is, to paraphrase Reuben Hasson,
a weapon in the hands of democracy's enemiesI.2  argue that the new
constitutionalism was intended to operate and does operate as an an-
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This paper is part of a larger project generously supported by the Social Sciences and
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salem, the Israel Law Review and the Israel Association for Canadian Studies. The
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1 Michael Mandel, "A Brief History of the New Constitutionalism, or 'How We Changed
Everything So That Everything Would Remain the Same'", (1998) 32 Isr. L.R. 250.
2 R.A. Hasson, "How to Hand Weapons to Your Enemies - The Charter of Rights
Fiasco", (June, 1982) 5 Steelshots.
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tidote to democracy, that it was meant to preserve the oligarchy of
private property from the mortal danger posed by representative insti-
tutions elected by people without property, the original Greek "demos"
from whence the term. As long as representative institutions were kept
the personal possessions of the rich, through limitations on suffrage and
other devices, their constitutional theorists sang the praises of parlia-
mentary sovereignty. But the moment the propertied classes lost control
of these institutions, these same constitutional theorists started to
worry about the "tyranny of the majority" the way they never worried
about the tyranny of the minority. They went to the drawing board and
came back with judicial review. They changed everything (namely con-
stitutional theory) so that everything (namely the oligarchy of the
wealthy) would remain the same. They placed boundaries around gov-
ernment action and called on the legal profession to police the bounda-
ries.
In my paper on constitutionalism, I try to sketch a proof of this thesis
by confronting the historical, empirical and philosophical arguments for
the democratic character ofjudicial review, drawing on as many histori-
cal and international examples as I can. A worthy thesis about judicial
review has constantly to measure itself up against the facts and must
emerge not only intact but actually enriched by confrontation with the
myriad national and supra-national varieties of the species. Experience
with the Canadian3 and Italian4 worlds of legal politics has also taught
me that the deeper one goes into the specifics, the more one learns about
the generalities.
Hence this paper's attempt to investigate the democratic question of
judicial review in yet another specific context. But here I must offer an
important caveat. Israel may be a little country but it has a big ego, one
which it comes by honestly, of course, as the cradle of many religions and
a territory violently disputed by empires for most of recorded history.
In other words, Israeli reality is complicated and not that easy to
penetrate. As a Jew, I am far from a stranger to this reality, but as a
3 See, for example, Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of
Politics in Canada (Thompson Educational Publishers, rev. ed., 1994) and, more
recently, Law, Politics and the Supreme Court: The Qu4bec Secession Case (The
Hebrew University of Jerusalem Halbert Center for Canadian Studies, 1998).
4 Michael Mandel,"Legal Politics Italian Style', in C. Neal Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder,
eds., The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New York University Press, 1995).
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non-resident with very little Hebrew there are limits to my abilities to
wrestle all the issues to the ground. Hence, I propose the following as
only a rough sketch of how the democracy question might be played out
in the legalization of politics in Israel, closer to the first than the last
word, and far more illustrative than exhaustive in its use of examples.
I more than welcome the response of Israeli scholars and I urge them
to answer the questions I can only raise.
The Legalization of Politics in Israel
Can the anti-democratic thesis, which seems to me to have so much
explanatory power in so many different contexts, shed any light on
Israel's constitutional developments? I propose to test it by examining
the history, theory and practice of Israeli constitutionalism. Histori-
cally, what has to be explained in Israel's case is the delay in the
adoption of modern constitutionalism until the 1990s, that is both its
failure in the early years of the state and the timing of its recent success.
Usually, constitutional judicial review appears contemporaneously with
extended suffrage, which allows its defenders to claim it as democratic
and its detractors to explain it as an antidote to democracy. Israel was
created with universal suffrage for its citizens, but its "constitutional
revolution" did not occur until more than forty years later. Theoretically,
the question is whether the democratic defence of modern constitution-
alism has more validity in the Israeli context than in others, primarily
because of the peculiar nature of Israeli politics which make for repre-
sentative institutions particularly prone, it is said, to anti-democratic
behaviour. Finally, what has to be accounted for and evaluated is the
Israeli court's record for delivering relatively democratic decisions, at
least when compared to the rest of the world's constitutional courts.
For reasons of space, I can give only the barest outline of the history
of Israel's constitutional development.5 Despite the enactment of several
"Basic Laws" and some exceptional decisions starting in the late 1960s
5 A full account can be found in Claude Klein, La Dgmocratie D'Israel (Editions du
Seuil, 1997) and a briefer one in David Kretzmer "The New Basic Laws on Human
Rights: A Mini-Revolution in Israeli Constitutional Law?", and "The Supreme Court
and Parliamentary Supremacy", in Itzhak Zamir and Allen Zysblat, eds., Public Law
in Israel (Clarendon Press, 1996) 141 and 303.
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on election financing (Bergman6 ), Israel remained under a parliamen-
tary sovereignty regime until the 1990s. The major turning point oc-
curred in 1992, the year of what Justice Aharon Barak, President of the
Supreme Court of Israel, has called the "constitutional revolution". In
that year, two new Basic Laws were passed containing many of the
important elements of a classic Bill of Rights: Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. As its title
indicates the former statute was more restricted in application, while
the latter had most of the elements of a classic liberal Bill of Rights,
except, notably, equality rights. It declared its purpose to be "to protect
human dignity and liberty, in order to anchor in a Basic Law the values
of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state".
It was not long before these laws bore their first jurisprudential fruit
(or rather meat). In the very year of their passage a provision of the Meat
and Meat Products Law was declared invalid as a violation the Basic
Law: Freedom of Occupation. The case, Meatrael v. Rabin,7 involved the
importation of non-kosher meat, that is meat that did not comply with
the Jewish religious dietary laws. However, this did not lead to a change
in the status of the importation of non-kosher meat, but rather to a
change in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. The Labour party govern-
ment of the time depended on the participation of the ultra-orthodox
Sephardi party, Shas, and it agreed to revise the Basic Law to allow for
exemptions of specific laws, including, naturally, the meat law, which
was later granted a permanent exemption.
8
The 1994 amendment of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation to
accommodate the meat question was also taken as an occasion to make
other substantial revisions to both of the 1992 Basic Laws. Each would
henceforth include an expansive new first section:
1. Fundamental human rights in Israel are founded upon recognition
of the value of the human being, the sanctity of human life, and the
principle that all persons are free; these rights shall be upheld in the
spirit of the principles set forth in the Declaration of the Establish-
ment of the State of Israel.
6 A. Bergman v. Minister of Finance and State Comptroller, in Zamir and Zysblat, ibid.,
at 310.
7 (1992) 47(v) P.D. 485.
8 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), March 19, 1998, at 3.
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The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel includes
several additional egalitarian elements conspicuously absent from the
two Basic Laws themselves:
The State of Israel ... will foster the development of the country for
the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice
and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure
complete equality of social and political rights to all of its inhabitants
irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of
religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will safe-
guard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to the
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.9
In addition to this change to both of the laws, Basic Law: Freedom
of Occupation was redrafted in the somewhat loftier terms of Human
Dignity and Liberty.
More Basic laws were formally introduced in 1998 (but not yet passed
as of this writing): three by the government (on the judicial system, on
freedom of expression and association, and on social rights) "in honor of
Israel's 50th anniversary",10 and one by an independent group of govern-
ment and opposition members to entrench freedom of religion and
religious pluralism."
In 1995, the Supreme Court issued its decision in United Mizrahi
Bank Ltd., et al. v. Migdal Cooperative Village, et al.12 in which Judge
Barak, joined by a majority of the court, outlined his theory that Israel
had, since 1992, achieved full-fledged constitutional judicial review, and
his defence of this as a democratic development. 13 The Court held that
this even applied to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty which
lacked the formal "rigidity" (an enhanced majority needed for amend-
ment) that had hitherto been regarded as a hallmark of constitutional
9 See the official government website <http:/www.israel-mfa.gov.il/peace/
independ.html> and Appendix to Daniel J. Elazar, ed., Constitutionalism: The Israeli
and American Experiences (University Press of America, 1990) 211; Eton Rishmi
14.5.1948 Vol. 1, p. 1, at p. 2.
10 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), February 6, 1998, at 1.
11 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), June 23, 1998, at 3.
12 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd., et al. v. Migdal Cooperative Village, et al. (1995) 49(iv)
P.D. 221, opinion of the President of the Court, Justice Aharon Barak.
13 Infra n. 79.
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status. However, the decision of the lower court striking down a farm
credit relief law as a violation of the right to property was reversed and
the law upheld. In 1997, the Supreme Court finally used its newly-
declared power in the case of a group of stockbrokers and actually
overruled a law as a violation of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.
14
Since the "constitutional revolution" of 1992 the courts, and espe-
cially the Supreme Court, have been more and more in the thick of
things, deciding and negotiating issues of religious pluralism and civil
rights. Its President, Justice Aharon Barak has a very high profile in
the mass-media. The court has been attacked by the religious parties for
a supposed ethnic and secular bias and it has been argued that a special,
more representative constitutional court should be adopted, along the
lines of most European jurisdictions. The court, for its part, has found
many defenders and has not been shy in its own defence. In June, 1998,
Justice Barak proposed a referendum on the constitution and declared
that a representative court would be a "disaster".
1 5
A Change of Everything So That Everything Would Remain the Same?
How does all this fit within the general panorama of the development
of modern constitutionalism? The answer seems to be "pretty well",
though there are some very important differences that need some ac-
counting for.
Developments from 1948-1973
The movement for a Bill of Rights can be usefully divided into two
stages, the first running from the founding of the State until roughly
1973. In the first stage, the movement seems to have had, for the most
part, the same kind of political sponsorship and political opposition that
we find throughout the history of modern constitutionalism, with the
political Right mostly in favour and the political Left mostly opposed.
The position did not change much from the configuration in the original
debate in the Knesset in 1950. In that debate the secular parties of the
14 Association of Investment Management in Israel v. The Minister of Finance.
15 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), June 18, 1998.
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Right were the advocates of a written constitution and a Bill of Rights.
The main components here were the General Zionists and the Herut.
The General Zionists were a classic party of property and business. They
wanted Prime Minister Ben Gurion to declare Zionism incompatible
with socialism. However the General Zionists were at first only a junior
partner in the opposition. The leading party was the Herut. The Herut
was the direct successor of the radical Revisionists and the terrorist
Etzel (or Irgun), whose main plank was an uncompromising position on
the national question (all of the ancient land of Israel for the Jews). i s
Though they were unflinchingly anti-Labour, their social and economic
position differed at first from the pro-business General Zionists, con-
taining much anti-capitalist rhetoric, alongside the anti-socialist kind. 7
At this stage Herut advocated a kind of state-corporatism, not funda-
mentally unlike Italian Fascism, with which the Revisionists were
notoriously close before Mussolini's anti-semitic turn in the late 1930s.'"
However, shortly after the elections to the Constituent Assembly and
certainly by the time the constitutional debate was taking place, Herut
modified its economic platform to be closer to the free-enterprising and
increasingly successful General Zionists, who replaced Herut as the
main opposition party in 1951. The two parties would ultimately merge
in Gahal in 1965 and Likud in 1973. Thus, in the 1950 debate on the
constitution, Herut leader Menachem Begin could be found arguing for
a Bill of Rights as a guarantee of the "night-watchman" state for which
"every free man prays".19 Herut's advocacy of a Bill of Rights has been
thought inconsistent with its other right-wing positions:
16 The designation "Revisionists" came precisely from the programme to revise the
boundaries of the State to include the whole of ancient Israel.
17 Peter Y. Medding, The Founding of Israeli Democracy, 1948-1967 (Oxford University
Press, 1990) 64.
18 Meir Michaelis, Mussolini and the Jews (Clarendon Press) 86-87.
19 "When liberal thought flourished it was said of the state's authority that it ought to
be limited to the role of 'night watchman'. That period is past, and every free man
prays that we will not be forced to admit that it has gone forever". Knesset Debates,
February 1, 1950 reprinted in Itamar Rabinovitch and Jehuda Reinharz, Israel in the
Middle East: Documents and Readings on Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations
1948-Present (Oxford University Press, 1984) 45. See also Amos Perlmutter, The Life
and Times of Menachem Begin (Doubleday & Co., 1987) 250ff. and Medding, supra
n. 17, at 39.
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Special circumstances have forced the Labor opponents into positions
not usually associated with conservatism. For example, Herut ... has
advocated laws to protect civil liberties.20
But, in fact, the advocacy of judicial review was merely the classic
position adopted by the parties of property in many constituent assem-
blies after the Second World War.
Also consistent with the general configuration of the period, at least
in Europe, was the position of the main party of the Left, the party of
labour, Ben Gurion's Mapai, which was opposed to the adoption of a Bill
of Rights. 21 In the Knesset debate, Ben Gurion mounted a strong defence
of the democratic character of parliamentary sovereignty and majority
rule.2 2 It is clear that one element of his opposition was an antipathy to
judicial review. According to one commentator, "most critical of the
constitutional role of the Supreme Court in the United States, he
claimed that even the Americans did not always accept it with love".23
In an earlier debate about due process and emergency regulations, Ben
Gurion had, in fact, rocked the legal profession with this statement:
Every jurist knows how easy it is to weave juridical cobwebs to prove
anything and refute anything ... as a law student I know that no one
can distort any text and invent farfetched assumptions and confusing
interpretation like the jurist.2
4
20 Don Peretz and Gideon Doron, The Government and Politics of Israel, (Westview
Press, 3rd ed., 1997) 108.
21 The notion of Mapai as a party of the Left is sometimes hard for Israelis to accept,
given its control of government and its general hegemony for the first 20 years of the
State's existence, not to mention its encouragement of private capital and its antipa-
thy to the Soviet Union. However, its labour-oriented and social democratic policies
and ideology - a welfare state with extensive union rights and most of the economy
in public or union hands - as well as its membership and constituency put it firmly
in the camp of contemporary European socialist parties. As in most of Western
Europe, the social democratic parties were the leading parties of the working class
with the communist parties very much junior partners. Where the communist parties
were dominant, they were non-revolutionary and reformist as well. See Donald
Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth
Century (Fontana Press, 1997).
22 Medding, supra n. 17, at 39.
23 Nathan Yanai, "Politics and Constitution-making in Israel: Ben-Gurion's Position on
the Constitutional Debate Following the Foundation of the State", in Elazar, supra
n. 9, at 107.
24 Pnina Lahav, 'Foundations of Rights Jurisprudence in Israel: Chief Justice Agranat's
Legacy", (1990) 24 Isr. L.R. 211, at 226.
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Ben Gurion's antipathy was in no way merely personal; it was an
axiom of the labour movement based on the broad experience of judicial
review as anti-labour and pro-property. The only examples of judicial
review known to Israel's first leaders were the American, German and
Austrian ones, all examples of reactionary courts that sided with the
rich against the poor, business against labour and the Right against the
Left. The position of Israel's Labour government was precisely the
position taken by the Italian Left - Socialists and Communists - who
railed, to no avail, against the obstacles put up by the new constitution
to the potential exercise of democratic, working-class sovereignty. It
would certainly be stretching things to accept Ben Gurion's claims to
have been motivated by abstract democratic principles, especially in
light of his subsequent attempts to abolish proportional representation
in favour of the much less democratic English riding system;25 but the
fact that his argument - that democratic societies do not need Bills of
Rights - prevailed among the generation who had lived through the
War is a nice corrective to the claims that the "lessons of history" had
proved to everybody that democracies could not survive without them.
Israeli Peculiarities: Disunity on the Left and Religious Opposition
If support for constitutionalism by the parties of business and oppo-
sition by the parties of labour put Israel in the classic mould, there were
some notable Israeli peculiarities.
In the first place, the Left was not united on the question, as it was,
for example, in Italy. Mapam, the Zionist socialists to Mapai's left,
joined Herut and the General Zionists in advocating a written consti-
tution and a Bill of Rights. It is not entirely clear whether Mapam
envisioned judicial review, however. The opposite seems true from the
Knesset debate:
What is the minimum beyond which the legislative, executive, and
judicial powers must not go? We feel that in a state like ours this is
25 Medding, supra n. 17, at 171-174. This is why the provision invoked in Bergman
(1969), enacted in 1958, had the special majority requirement; it was put there to
protect proportional representation: Klein, supra n. 5, at 163.
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one of the most important factors, and for this reason the drafting of
a constitution is an urgent matter.
26
Mapam was rigorously pro-Soviet until the Prague trials in the mid-
fifties (when a Mapam member was put on trial in Czechoslovakia for
spying), and the Soviet Union had a famous written constitution, full of
separation of powers and, most notably, ambitious social rights along-
side the traditional political and civil rights. However, the Soviet con-
stitution eschewed judicial review, and was understood mainly as an
outline of the governmental structure and, on the question of rights, as
an educative document. These aspects were the ones stressed by Mapam.
It is hard to believe, at any rate, that Herut and Mapam could ever have
agreed on a concrete proposal.
2 7
Another peculiarity in Israel was the opposition of the religious
element, who claimed the Torah was Israel's only constitution. Religious
opposition to the secularism of the Supreme Court started with the
boycott of its inauguration in 1948 and has remained implacable to the
present day.28 This is to be distinguished from the support given to the
constitution by the religious parties ("Christian Democrats") in Ger-
many and Italy, though it must be said that these parties were also the
parties of property, while the religious parties in Israel have always
been more narrow in their focus.
What Took So Long?
But what really distinguished Israel was that the modern constitu-
tionalist movement did not make any headway at all for an entire
generation after the State's establishment, especially when it was suc-
26 Yisrael Bar-Yehudah (Mapam), Knesset Debates February 1, 1950, supra n. 19, at
44 (emphasis added).
27 "The left (Mapam) and right (Herut) were in uneasy - and often acrimonious -
alliance over the need for a constitution or bill of rights: the one, to enshrine its labor
ideology as a national heritage, the other, to protect itself and other minorities from
deviation from constitutional freedoms through a parliamentary "mechanical major-
ity". Avraham Avi-hai, Ben Gurion State-Builder: Principles and Pragmatism 1948-
1963 (John Wiley and Sons, 1974) 251.
28 Pnina Lahav, "The Supreme Court of Israel: Formative Years 1948-1955", (1990) 11
Studies in Zionism 45, at 49.
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ceeding so famously elsewhere in the world. The standard explanations
of Israel's failure in this regard fall into the two categories of ideology
and party politics.
Ideology?
The ideological explanations include the influence of the British
tradition of parliamentary sovereignty and a reluctance to adopt a
constitution for the Jewish people when only a tiny minority of the
world's Jews lived in the country. On examination, these explanations
turn out to be unconvincing. The British tradition was even more
powerful in India, and, at the very moment of Israel's foundation, a rigid
constitution was being enacted there to protect private property from
democracy. The British themselves had even shown the way with the
entrenched property provisions of the Government of India Act in 1935.29
Indeed, it's only logical: every country that has adopted constitutional
judicial review, from 18th century America to 20th century South Af-
rica, has had to do so in violation of a prior tradition, and that includes
Canada in 1982.
The argument that Israelis were yet only a tiny minority of the
Jewish people was made in the 1950 debate on the constitution as a
counsel of patience: since the country was counting on massive immi-
gration, it was too soon to lay down a definitive constitution.3 0 In fact,
the population would double within six years and quadruple within
twenty, with Israel's percentage of the world's Jews increasing from
5.7% in 1948 to 12.8% in 1954 to 27.4% in 1986 and 35% in 1996. 11 But,
the argument proves too much. If it were true, how could one account
for the momentous decisions Israel took through the years of its under-
representation of world Jewry, from defining "who is a Jew" through war
and peace? And how could one account for the fact that Israel more or
less quickly enacted all the components of a constitution except judicial
review? And that, when it finally did enact judicial review, it was still
a society deep in flux and constituting but a third of the Jews of the
world?
29 H.C.L. Merrillat, Land and the Constitution in India (Columbia University Press,
1970) 37-51.
30 Rabinovitch and Reinharz, supra n. 19.
31 Asher Arian, The Second Republic: Politics in Israel (Chatham House, 1998) 26.
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Party Politics?
The party-political explanations include the opposition of the reli-
gious parties (who were part of the Mapai-led government coalition) and
the problems that a Bill of Rights might have posed for the policies of
the government. These included such classic constitutional flash-points
as the inevitable discriminatory treatment of the large Arab-Muslim
minority in a state that was meant by its founders to be a "Jewish state",
the confiscation of property for settlement, and emergency security
measures in the continuing state of tension with the surrounding Arab
countries.
The opposition of the religious parties should probably be regarded
more as an asset to Mapai in its opposition to a constitution, because
it was certainly not an insurmountable obstacle. The religious parties
were always a minority whose opposition could be overcome by a com-
bination of the majority secular forces. It should not be forgotten that
the religious parties boycotted the inauguration of the Supreme Court
because it was too secular for them - but they did not leave the coalition
over it. And in the late fifties it was always possible to govern without
the religious parties and with Mapam. It took the religious parties until
1982 to even shut down the national airline on the Sabbath.12 The notion
of a Mapai that would have drafted a Bill of Rights but for the opposition
of the religious parties is very far-fetched. Furthermore, the religious
parties could have been accommodated by any number of drafting
manoeuvres, as indeed the Italian Constituent Assembly had managed
to accommodate the privileges of the Catholic Church by entrenching
them in the constitution of 1948. In fact, when the Basic Laws of 1992
were passed it was over the opposition of the religious parties, notwith-
standing their greatly increased political weight, but the laws were
drafted in such a way as to exclude questions that might offend their
constituents. All rights having to do with religious freedom were ex-
cluded completely, a concession proponents of the Bill of Rights had
already made in 1988;11 and the problem of equality was solved by the
deft formula of "a Jewish and democratic state". The religious parties
have had no problem getting and extending their notwithstanding
32 Martin Gilbert, Israel: A History (Doubleday, 1998) 502.
33 Amnon Rubinstein, "The Struggle Over a Bill of Rights in Israel" in Elazar, supra
n. 9, at 141.
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clause for the ban on non-kosher meat, and when the Justice Minister
introduced the new fiftieth anniversary Basic Laws, he promised the
religious leaders in writing "that the laws would not affect religious law
or questions of religion and state," and that he would "consult them
about the implications of every paragraph".
34
The availability of formulae like "Jewish and democratic" also shows
why the fear of potential Arab claims for equality cannot explain the
delay of constitutionalization. Constitutions do not automatically result
in successful equality claims, because constitution writers (not to men-
tion constitutional courts) generally have little problem dealing with
questions of special minority rights in one way or another. Again,
Canada is an example. It enacted a constitution against the will and
over the opposition of the large French minority, entrenching special
language rights for only two of the many linguistic groups in the
country. In Israel, the "constitutional revolution" took place at the very
moment when the claims of the Arab minority in Israel proper and the
territories occupied since 1967 were being advanced more strongly than
ever, a period spanning the Intifada and the Oslo Peace Accords.
Labour Hegemony
No, the real difference in Israel seems to have been the simple one
of the balance of forces. The classic advocates of judicial review, the
parties of property and limited government, were in opposition, and the
classic opponent of judicial review, the party of labour and big govern-
ment, was firmly entrenched in power.
The balance of power between property and labour was different in
Israel because Israel was an entirely different type of state from the old
states that adopted judicial review in the twentieth century. Granted
the Jews had ancient claims to the land, nevertheless virtually the
entire polity of the new state had settled in the quarter-century since
the Balfour Declaration of 1917. Though the class structure was not
untypical of Europe, it was the representatives of the working class and
not the bourgeoisie who were in control of the indigenous movement for
a Jewish State and then of the State itself. The main political, social and
economic institutions were under Labour hegemony well before the
34 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), February 6, 1998, at 1.
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establishment of the State. The Labour-controlled Histadrut was the
country's largest entrepreneur and employer and Ben Gurion was the
head of the Histadrut before founding Mapai. The degree of organization
of labour, its control of the economy and its representation in the State
was unheard-of outside the Soviet bloc. By 1969, most salaried employ-
ees worked either for the government or the Histadrut.3 5 Public expendi-
ture as a percentage of GNP rose from 33.1% in 1960 to 59.8% in 1970,
peaking at 82.8% in 1975.36 Although Labour governed without the
parties to its left, the combined electoral strength of Jewish socialism
and communism from 1949 until 1973 was an absolute majority.
How different this was from Germany or Austria in the twenties or
Italy and Germany after the Second World War, when the Right was
still powerful enough to impose limited government on the new repre-
sentative institutions. It was very far from the virtually universal
situation in Europe of an old, aristocratic, financial and industrial
propertied class having to admit universal suffrage, but retaining the
political hegemony necessary to maintain control through constitutional
means. In fact, in Israel capital was very weak and actually dependent
on the State. Because of the extraordinary reliance on the importation
of both capital and labour, Israel developed a very "strong state". And,
far from posing a threat to a developed ruling class, since the Labour
Party was, in fact, moderate on economic issues, the state was a crucial
factor in the "incubation" of capitalism until it could stand on its own
two feet.3 7 Labour hegemony was an effect of the real political economy
of Israel in the first generation after statehood. The successful resist-
ance to judicial review was an effect of this hegemony. No Western
European labour, socialist or social democratic party was in any way
near such a favourable position, and where they came close, as in
Britain, Sweden and Norway, judicial review did not take hold until
35 Arian, supra n. 31, at 59.
36 Yair Aharoni, "The Changing Political Economy of Israel", Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Sciences (1998) 127, at 132.
37 Ami Ben-Porat, The State and Capitalism in Israel (Greenwood Press, 1993). Israel,
in its founding period, was "the country with the largest amount of governmental
influence on the detailed operation of the economy among all western-type demo-
cratic states". It was characterized by a "relative weakness of private employers" who
were "effectively ... represented by the government": Medding, supra n. 17, at 109,
116.
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near the end of the century with the accession of the former two
countries to the European Community.
38
Of course, it is possible to look at all of this outside of class questions,
as a matter of pure power politics. What could be more natural than for
the party in power to oppose judicial review and for the party in
opposition to support it? Except that where the ruling party is a party
of property, or where property is powerful enough to impose its condi-
tions, there have been many contrary cases. The original United States
Constitution was one, and Austria of 1920 was another, as were Italy
and Germany after World War II, France in 1958, Spain in 1975,
Canada in 1982, Russia in 1993 and South Africa in 1994.39 In all of
these cases, parties of government advocated or agreed to constitutional
judicial review. The mistake in the conventional power-politics explana-
tion lies in seeing governments only in terms of their own interests and
not in terms of the interests they represent, or in terms of the relations
of power and the balance of social forces in the country.
Naturally, class questions should not be overemphasized. Israel's
government had many other things on its mind in the state's formative
years.40 All governments do. But the point is not to explain everything
in terms of class struggle, or even to attribute any great importance to
the issue of judicial review in the political calculations of the leaders of
the various parties. On the contrary, what has to be grasped is the very
impudence of judicial review, the novelty of "that bizarre creature" as
the Italian Communist leader Togliatti had recently called it, 41 fash-
ioned by the propertied classes as one of several possible antidotes to the
enormous dangers posed by the new phenomenon of governments elected
by the propertyless classes. Why should such a government accept limits
38 Sassoon, supra n. 21, at 27-59; 117-36.
39 Mandel, supra n. 1.
40 As Ben Gurion told Mapam in 1949: "We will eventually establish a socialist regime,
but for the immediate years ahead our concern must be immigrant absorption. Our
national income is very small. It must be increased by raising productivity, using
more modern machinery, introducing improved management techniques, and re-
straining the greed of the capitalists - all this demands planning". David Ben
Gurion, Israel: A Personal History (Funk & Wagnalls, 1971) 344. "We are the sons
of a people whose fate differs from that of all other peoples, and we are faced with
a task that was not imposed upon the workers of any other country". Gilbert, supra
n. 32, at 251.
41 Mandel, supra n. 1, at 269.
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on the sovereignty it had only just finally conquered if it didn't have to?
The point is to see judicial review, at any rate in the first half of the
twentieth century, as something that the propertied classes managed to
impose on fledgling representative institutions in those cases where the
parties of the working class were not in a position to resist.
So the hegemony of labour at the helm of a strong state and the
relative weakness of capital seem to me the most convincing explanation
for the lack of a constitutional Bill of Rights in the first generation of
the State's existence.
42
Developments from 1973 to the Present
Shinui, Free Enterprise, Electoral Reform and the Bill of Rights
Now it is precisely when this equation changed that the tide turned
in favour of constitutionalization. This happened around 1973 after
Labour's sharp drop at the polls from 46.2% in 1969 to 39.6% in 1973,
with Likud (the successor to Herut and the General Zionists) topping
the 30% threshold for the first time, up from 21.7% to 30.2%.4 3 It was
then that the movement for a constitutional Bill of Rights took on new
allies. One important group was represented by the party Shinui
("change") led by Amnon Rubinstein, a law professor from Tel Aviv
University. Shinui was formed in 1973 with a Bill of Rights as a central
part of its platform. The party was in the classic mould of proponents
of Bills of Rights, as its programme contained other typical "liberal"
42 "Further examination of the attitude of the parties of the Left in Western Europe to
constitutional questions confirms that virtually all of them were united in their
unashamed centralism ... But they were all also 'parliamentarist': they were not in
favour of presidential systems ... nor were they in favour of a strong constitutional
court or a second chamber which would weaken the powers of the main chamber. This
is not surprising: the Jacobin tradition of the centralist state had been incorporated
lock, stock and barrel to the continental socialist tradition. Socialists assumed that
a move away from capitalism would require a firm use of the state machine: there
was no point in limiting its powers. Constitutional courts gave power to senior judges
and the Left - quite understandably - did not trust judges ... The allergy of the
British Labour Party to any constitutionalism originated in the same fear: any
obstacle to parliamentary sovereignty would be used by its opponents to block
reforms and socialism". Sassoon, supra n. 21, at 131.
43 Klein, supra n. 5, at 324.
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measures, including privatization of the economy and electoral reform,
the latter aimed at doing away with Israel's very pure form of propor-
tional representation in favour of constituency-based elections. Only the
great importance of peace in Israeli politics could allow the party to
present itself as left-wing:
Although it supported free enterprise, privatization and electoral
reform, Shinui announced that it considered itself part of the Labor-
left camp. Shinui's identification with a dovish position regarding the
Arab-Israeli conflict led many to mistake it for a left-wing party.
44
Indeed, Rubinstein, in describing his Bill of Rights initiative in 1990,
admitted that he had essentially copied the Likud programme:
Now this bill of rights, this Basic Law of individual freedoms or
freedoms of the individual passed its first reading in the previous
Knesset through a trick I employed. I simply copied verbatim the law
presented by the Likud in the Fifth Knesset a long time ago [1961-
65] when they were still at least apparently committed to the idea
of civil rights and I embarrassed them into voting for it. Once they
voted for it, the Labor opposition could not afford to vote against it
and so it was passed unanimously without a majority actually want-
ing it. That happens occasionally.
45
The calls for free enterprise and a Bill of Rights continued to be
linked through to the 1990s. Here is an example from political scientist
Ira Sharkansky who, after complaining that "Israel's government domi-
nates the national economy like none other outside the socialist block,"
wrote:
The democratic norms of Israel encourage each sector to press the
government for even more outlays. The Israeli government cannot
order labor unions, industries, or citizen groups to cease demanding
government aid for the purposes that they favor. Israel's lack of a
written constitution allows the government to do whatever a major-
44 Peretz and Doron, supra n. 20, at 105.
45 Rubinstein, supra n. 33, at 139.
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ity of the Knesset desires ... Israeli citizens cannot call on a legal
measure of special standing when they seek to assert their rights
against a bureaucrat's ruling or against the law that stands behind
it. 4 6
Shinui played a crucial role in the first transition of power from Left
to Right by joining forces with the Democratic Movement for Change in
the 1977 election. The thrust of this movement was electoral reform, a
goal also extremely important to Shinui. The plan was to introduce a
constituency system which, by eliminating or at least reducing the
influence of the small parties in favour of two or three large, less
ideologically divergent ones, would make alternation more likely and
thus break the dominance of Labour. A small move had already been
made in this direction with new electoral rules in 1973 that distributed
unused votes to the larger parties (instead of to the smaller parties, as
had previously been the case) and a move to direct local elections in
1975. The surprising success of the Democratic Movement for Change
in 1977 in syphoning off almost a third of Labour's votes actually lead
to the immediate transfer of power to the Likud. Though the DMC joined
the Likud in government, Shinui itself split and joined the opposition.
Labour was never to regain its hegemony. In fact, the effective deadlock
of the two parties lead to national unity governments between from
1984-90.
The Decline of the WASP
The drive for electoral reform intensified as a result of another
important development of the 1977 election, the political self-affirma-
tion of the Sephardi Jews whose origins were in the Arab world as
opposed to Europe. This poorer, more religious community had by now
achieved net demographic preponderance, and by 1977 had moved
substantially to Likud. The ethnic card played particularly strongly in
the 1981 elections, primarily to Likud's advantage; but it did not find
a permanent home in the Ashkenazi-led Right. Instead, the nineteen-
eighties saw the rapid development of specifically Sephardi parties, as
46 Ira Sharkansky, "Israel's Political Economy", in Ehud Sprinzak and Larry Diamond,
eds., Israeli Democracy Under Stress (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993) 154.
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well as the resurgence of specifically religious parties. This signified a
loss of political hegemony, not just for the Labour Party, but for the so-
called "WASP" ("White Ashkenazi Sabra/Secular with Proteksya [con-
nections]") in general. Both Labour and Likud started to haemorrhage
badly. Labour's percentage of the vote declined from 36.6% in 1981 to
34.9% in 1984 to 30% in 1988. Likud had dropped from 37.1% to 31.8%
over the same period. Between 1984 and 1988, the ultra-orthodox par-
ties and the Sephardi Shas rose from 8.3% of the votes to 13.1%. Shinui,
too, had peaked in 1984 at 2.6% and was back to 1.7% in 1988.
4
1
So the loss of hegemony of the big parties was itself only a symptom
of a loss of control of the political system by the secular Ashkenazi elite
of all of the parties. It was this more than anything that intensified the
attempts to change the electoral system in a strongly majoritarian
direction. Apart from the proposal to move to the extreme first-past-the-
post English system, there was also a proposal to move to the more
moderate German system under which half of the seats would be
distributed on a majoritarian basis and half on a proportional basis.
This was to be accompanied by a raised minimum threshold of 3.3% from
the 1% then in force for Knesset elections. After the inconclusive elec-
tions of 1988 and a second national unity government, this time under
Likud leadership, Rubinstein formed the cross-party lobby group "A
Constitution for Israel" with another law professor from Tel Aviv,
Labour MK David Libai and right-wingers Uriel Linn of Likud and
Yoasch Tsidon of Tsomet. The group took advantage of the rise in
political discontent over the national unity governments. One study
showed that, between 1973 and 1990, negative responses to how Israelis
"saw politics in Israel" went from 30% (1973) to 56% (1984) to 77%
(1990).48 It was in this context that the electoral reforms and the Basic
Laws of 1992 were passed, essentially, if not formally, as a package. The
attempt to dislodge the proportional system failed, and only a slight rise
(from 1% to 1.5% of the vote) in the minimum threshold for entering the
Knesset was achieved. However, the reformers did manage to get a law
passed for the direct election of the Prime Minister at the same time as
the Basic Laws. This law provided for run-off elections if necessary with
the prize going to the first candidate to top 50% of the votes. The
47 Klein, supra n. 5, at 326.
48 Gadi Wolfsfeld, "The Politics of Provocation Revisited: Participation and Protest in
Israel," in Sprinzak and Diamond, supra n. 46.
ISRAEL LAW REVIEW
practical power of the successful candidate was strengthened by making
it legally impossible to remove the Prime Minister without new Prime
Ministerial elections, which, in the absence of an extraordinary no-
confidence vote of eighty out of one hundred and twenty members, would
result in new elections for the entire Knesset. This was supposed to
increase the bargaining power of the Prime Minister to form coalitions
and to keep them intact and in line.
In fact, when first put into practice in 1996, the law had the effect
of allowing voters to divide their vote between the Prime Ministerial
election, in which they chose one of the two major contenders, and the
Knesset elections, in which they were free to vote their identities. This
is thought to have lead to the further voter fragmentation that occurred
in that election and the resultant apparent increase in bargaining power
in the hands of the small parties. In 1998 attempts were already
underway to repeal the law. A Ha'aretz editorial of 1998 shows how
important the object of weakening the power of the small parties was
in the eyes of the supporters of the law:
The direct election law has failed to fulfil the principle goal it was
supposed to attain - namely, reduction of the pressure of the ultra-
Orthodox parties - and has even increased extortionist efforts to the
point of paralyzing the government. Furthermore the law has failed
to live up to its promise that it would increase the prime minister's
manoeuvrability ... 49
But the editorial also indicates that there was another perfectly
predictable effect of the law besides the weakening of small parties:
The direct election method has weakened both the Knesset and the
government and any prime ministers elected through that political
method will turn their political party into a convenient instrument
for achieving their goals and will simply drain the party of all its
power and ideological content. The same process that the Likud
underwent is now occurring in the Labor party, where Ehud Barak
has cut himself off from the old guard, has severed his links with the
party's ideological platform and has plunged into hot water by adopt-
ing contradictory positions and by creating bizarre coalitions ... Such
49 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), May 19, 1998, at 6.
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moves blur Labor's identity. The direct election law has now pro-
duced another candidate for the prime ministership: Tel Aviv Mayor
Roni Milo, who is galloping toward the post of prime minister on the
back of a vague center despite the lack of both a political movement
and a platform."
Amnon Rubinstein's own defence of the law despite these effects (on
the unconvincing ground that it would prevent an ultra-orthodox Prime
Minister from being elected) suggests that the weakening of the Knesset
and the "end of ideology" - a classic objective of free enterprisers - was
part of the objective all along. 1 It was also no surprise when, in 1998,
a joint Labor-Likud lobby took advantage of the discontent with the law
to re-propose constituency elections with raised minimum thresholds.
52
Neo-Liberal Economics and the Constitution
So the party of the Bill of Rights was also a party of electoral reforms
aimed at artificially preserving the hegemony of an elite that had lost
its appeal to the electorate. It was also the party of neo-liberal econom-
ics, in favour of freeing the economy from political interference through
privatization of public enterprise, de-regulation of markets and re-
commodification of services. And, indeed, the movement for a Bill of
Rights is almost exactly co-extensive with the movement to end Labour
control over the economy through the state and the Histadrut. Quite
momentous changes occurred over the period.
In the mid-seventies, under the international and local pressures
that hit governments and labour movements throughout the world,
Israel's "strong state" that had dominated the economy in partnership
with the Labour movement, started to weaken. Stagnation in the sev-
enties was followed by hyper-inflation in the eighties. To get out of debt,
the state was forced to accept such market-imposed austerity measures
as public service spending cuts and the privatization of its assets to its
creditors.5 3 After 1975, public expenditure started to decline as a per-
50 Ibid.
51 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), June 2, 1998, at 6.
52 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), July 6, 1998, at 1.
53 Aharoni, supra n. 36, at 137-139.
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centage of GNP from a peak of 82.8% in 1975 to 77.4% in 1980 to 70.5%
in 1985 to 59.4% in 1990 to 54.7% in 1994 and 56% in 1995.54 In the
words of Ran Hirschl, who has recently made a powerful argument for
linking Israel's constitutional revolution to its neo-liberal economic
revolution:
The state's roll-back from the formerly state-controlled public serv-
ices arena, as well as an increasing recommodification of formerly
decommodified services, indicate Israel's movement toward a variant
of neo-liberal market economy. Examples of these two processes are
the new Medicare Law (1994); the recent privatization of health,
media and telecommunications services, and state owned banks; the
gradual deregulation of the land market; the complete deregulation
of the foreign currency market; and the emergence of private medical
services and private higher education institutions. In addition, the
local market has been opened to multinationals and imported goods;
consumption patterns have become "Americanized"; and a "stock
exchange culture" has arisen".5"
Equally important for the hegemony of labour was the virtual de-
struction of the Histadrut, once the economy's powerhouse. By 1995, it
had been deprived of its enterprises and its privileged position in health
services and reduced to a mere trade union with a membership that had
been depleted by 75% since only ten years before. Nor was economic
liberalism a partisan matter; it infected Labour and Likud ranks equally.
It was Labour maverick Haim Ramon who led the dismantling of the
Histadrut.
The state and Labour ceded their ground directly to private business.
Their slack was picked up by the big international firms whose direct
capital investment had soared by 1995 to $2.3 billion, rivalling the
American government's $3 billion per year in grants.56 By the time of
the constitutional revolution, capital's "incubation" period was clearly
over and it was strong enough to stand on its own two feet. A predictable
result of this was that, by the 1990s, the highly egalitarian society of the
54 Ibid., at 132.
55 Ran Hirschl, "Israel's 'Constitutional Revolution': The Legal Interpretation of En-
trenched Civil Liberties in an Emerging Neo-Liberal Economic Order", (1998) 46
American Journal of Comparative Law 427, at 432-433.
56 Arian, supra n. 31, at 66.
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heyday of Labour hegemony had outstripped even the United States in
economic inequality.17 In this context, the electoral defections from
Labour that started with the Democratic Movement for Change (which
has been attributed partly to a tax revolt by high earning former Labour
supporters"), can be seen as a shift in allegiance of a significant segment
of the old WASP elite - a jumping ship from the leaky state/labour
sector to the buoyant private sector where these people became the new
elite of manufacturers, bankers, hoteliers, directors-general "and a large
group of lawyers who represent economic organizations". 9
It's easy to see how all this would lead to the double solution of
electoral reform and constitutional rights.
Electoral reform would allow the maintenance of control over the
representative institutions by those who had lost the support of the
electorate, by forcibly narrowing the choices in the election for Prime
Minister to one of the two major groupings and by increasing the
strength of the office itself. As for the Bill of Rights, its guarantees
against the state - in typical fashion, the Basic Laws applied only to
the government - would limit the power of the representative institu-
tions to interfere with the private sector where the elite increasingly
made its increasingly unequal living. More importantly, the court was
one of the places dominated by the very elite that was pushing for the
reforms. It is a fact, as the religious and Sephardi parties claim,60 that
the courts, and especially the Supreme Court, are overwhelmingly
secular and Ashkenazi. 61 And given the method by which judges are
appointed, it is likely to remain that way. Right now, all judges, includ-
ing Supreme Court judges, are chosen by a committee in which not only
is the legal profession in a net majority, but the Supreme Court itself
57 Ibid., at 70-71.
58 Ibid., at 70.
59 Yossi Beilin, Israel: A Concise Political History (St. Martin's Press, 1992) 214. See
also Yitzhak Rabin's speech to the Knesset on July 13, 1992: "Rabin made it clear
that the Labour Party was finally turning its back on its Socialist legacy. His
government would, he pledged, increase economic growth by 'retooling the economy
for open management, free of administrative restrictions and superfluous govern-
ment involvement'. There was, he said, 'too much paperwork, not enough produc-
tion'": Gilbert, supra n. 32, at 551.
60 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), February 4, 1998, at 1.
61 Klein, supra n. 5, at 145: "Le ddbat actuel porte donc sur le portrait type du juge t
la Cour supreme, prgsdntg comme ashkdnaze, libgral et laique. La vgrit6 est que la
grande majoritd des juges nommds correspondent bien & ce moddle".
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is actually dominant. The Committee consists of two Cabinet Ministers,
two Members of the Knesset, two lawyers chosen by the Bar Council and
three Supreme Court Judges (of which one must be the President)
chosen by of the Supreme Court judges themselves. According to Allen
Zysblat, "a convention exists that a candidate for the Supreme Court
will not be selected if the choice is not acceptable to representatives of
that Court".62 The judges, who can be appointed at any age, can only be
forced to retire at age seventy. There appears to be no constitutional
court so self-perpetuating in the world. What better refuge from the
anti-WASP storm engulfing parliament?
Israel appears to fit the category of constitutionalization as a change
of, if not "everything", then of some important things, in order to keep
things the same. In fact, there are several historical precedents strik-
ingly close to the Israeli situation. In Canada, the loss of control of the
Quebec legislature by the federalist forces led to the imposition of a
constitutional re-arrangement that subjected the government of Quebec
to the supervision of a Supreme Court of Canada appointed entirely by
the federalists themselves. There is also a striking similarity in the
Israeli developments of the 1990s and the Austrian developments of
1929, in the simultaneous expansion of the role of the constitutional
court and the innovation of direct election of the head of the government,
a move denounced at the time by constitutionalist Hans Kelsen as a step
toward the dictatorship that actually took over five years later.6 3 In
Italy, the current attempts to squeeze out the small parties after a loss
of hegemony of the old guard, and the move toward the direct election
of the Prime Minister, are also part of a package that includes a yet more
prominent role for the constitutional court.
64
The Democratic Defence
Naturally, these changes have not been presented by their sponsors
in the terms I have used to analyze them, that is as an antidote to
democracy. On the contrary, as any observer of the Israeli constitutional
62 Allen Zysblat, "The System of Government", in Zamir and Zysblat, supra n. 5, 1 at
15.
63 Mandel, supra n. 1.
64 Parlamento italiano, commissione bicamerale, Testo approvato il 4 novembre 1997:
Progetto di legge costituzionale.
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debate well knows, the constitutional revolution in Israel, as elsewhere,
has been presented as a change in aid of democracy.6 5 In the rest of this
paper, I propose to examine the democratic defence of the constitutional
revolution on both the theoretical and the empirical terrains.
There are essentially two versions of the democratic defence of mod-
ern constitutionalism: a political one that relies on traditional
majoritarian notions of democracy, and a judicial one that says democ-
racy is not about majority rule at all.
Protecting the Majority
According to the political defence, Israel is supposed to present the
case of a secular majority held hostage by a religious minority - what's
more an anti-democratic minority that knows how to manipulate the
parliamentary system. For this we are told that we need the protection
of electoral reform and the courts. This is how Amnon Rubinstein
described his preference for the new electoral system he helped to
create:
Since the Likud came to power in 1977, the ultra-Orthodox parties
have been the ones to tip the scales at election time, and no govern-
ment can be established without them. What is wrong with that? In
many parliamentary democracies, the size of the coalition and the
identity of the prime minister depend on minority parties. The prob-
lem with the ultra-Orthodox occupying this position is an entirely
different one. First, unlike most of Europe's center parties, the ultra-
Orthodox are not a part of the national-Zionist consensus - for
reasons that range from their attitude toward Israel's flag and na-
tional anthem to their failure to serve in the army. Secondly, the
ultra-Orthodox parties are not ordinary democratic parties.1
6
65 Mandel, supra n. 1.
66 Amnon Rubinstein, "The Benefits of Direct Elections" Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), June 2,
1998, at 6. See also Bernard Susser, "The Direct Election of the Prime Minister: A
Balance Sheet", in Daniel J. Elazar and Shmuel Sandler, eds., Israel at the Polls 1996
(Frank Cass, 1998) 237, at 239: "to avoid the demoralizing spectacle of coalition-
making parties abjectly prostrating themselves to their potential junior coalition
partners".
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Another example is the statement of Yossi Sarid, the leader of Meretz
(of which Shinui is one component) on the passage of the kosher meat
amendment to Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation:
The vote constituted a non-kosher parliamentary slaughter of the
interests of a majority of the Israeli public.
67
The claim to speak for the majority seems to have its basis in the fact
that perhaps 70% of the Jewish population can be defined as secular.6s
But it is not at all clear that this majority agrees with Rubinstein and
Sarid on any of the positions they advocate. Take the issue of civil
marriages, now banned in Israel. Rubinstein has, in fact, introduced a
Basic Law: Freedom of Religion that seems to have the recognition of
civil marriages as its main point. However, a 1993 study found that,
despite this mainly secular public, only 39 percent of Israeli Jews
favoured the introduction of civil marriages, while 44 percent were
opposed and the rest were uncertain.69
So we have an unclear majority. How do we clarify it? Do we go to
court? But even those who claim judicial review is essentially "demo-
cratic" (a question we discuss below) do not claim that it is a mechanism
for determining majority will. Certainly it cannot do that as well as a
legislature. Well then, do we reform the electoral system to narrow the
choices to one between the two mainstream secular parties or, even
worse, to introduce constituency voting so as to allow government
against the majority? That won't do it either, of course. In fact, the
67 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), March 19, 1998, at 3. Meretz is a small party based around peace
and civil rights, made up of the tiny remnant of Mapam, the civil rights party Ratz,
and Shinui. It received 7.4% of the vote in 1996.
68 Klein, supra n. 5, at 73. Naturally, the percentage is disputed. There is some
participation in religious practices even by those who define themselves as secular:
Yochanan Peres and Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar, Trends in Israeli Democracy: The
Public View (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992) 28. On the other hand 56% of Israeli
Jews never attend synagogue on the Sabbath: Daniel J. Elazar and Shmuel Sandler,
"Introduction: The Battle over Jewishness and Zionism in the Post-Modern Era", in
Elazar and Sandler, eds., supra n. 66, at 15.
69 Klein, supra n. 5, at 77. Perhaps it is relevant here to add that I define myself as a
secular Jew and that I find it absurd that civil marriages are not permitted in Israel.
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almost pure form of proportional representation practiced in Israel
seems to be practically the best means of finding out what the majority
really wants, because the distribution of the various representatives in
the Knesset is about as close as you can get to the distribution of views
in the population. Since one cannot pass a law in the Knesset unless one
has more than fifty percent of the MKs, that means that, in Israel, you
get about as close as possible to the situation where one cannot pass a
law without the support of more than fifty percent of the voters. When
one party "holds the others hostage", this just means that, without that
party's agreement, one does not have the majority one claims to have.
Nor is this what Ronald Dworkin and Justice Barak deprecate as a mere
"statistical democracy" of isolated individuals.7 0 These numbers repre-
sent real collective interests and values shared among and between real
communities. Proportional representation epitomizes representative
democracy because it does not allow one to pretend to represent a
majority of these real people when one does not in fact represent them.
It does not allow one to ignore the claims of the various minority
communities that make up the majorities of real life. They have to count
equally, not according to whether they appeal to legal principles that
some court recognizes, but precisely according to their real, one-person-
one-vote representativeness. Treating people as equals is the real his-
torical and moral foundation of democracy. It requires taking equal
account of everybody's interests as seen by them. That includes the way
people rank their interests, their priorities. Proportional representation
is the best practical expression of this because it requires compromise,
not as a virtue but as a necessity, born out of the need to form a real
majority. Proportional representation is therefore a material guarantee
that everybody's interests, as seen by them, will be taken into account
equally. What is decried by the electoral reformers as the "demoralizing
spectacle" of big parties having to make deals with small parties is
simply this. Proportional representation is the surest way of affording
70 Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution
(Harvard University Press, 1996) 19; United Mizrahi Bank, supra n. 12, at 122.
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the members of the minority "equal concern and respect" (in Dworkin's
words) to that of the members of the majority.
7'
"Majority Rule is Undemocratic!"
The second democratic defence of the constitutional revolution is all
about the courts and takes us deep into the heart of legalized politics.
This defence does not depend on implausible assumptions about a real
majority will outside of representative institutions but frankly admits
that the point is to limit what the majority wants; it tries, instead, to
show that this is nevertheless "democratic". By now this defence has
several classic elements to it which can be found echoing throughout the
world of modern constitutionalism.
The first element is the detachment of democracy from majority rule.
Democracy is re-defined as being about democratic results: the promo-
tion of democratic values, human rights, and equality. It is no longer,
71 Dworkin, ibid., at 8. The point can be illustrated by the failure of a Labour-sponsored
attempt in July 1998 to end the exemptions from compulsory military service granted
to ultra-orthodox Jews (Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), July 8, 1998, 1). The law failed despite
the claims of its sponsors that the majority of Israelis were in favour of ending the
exemption. One stumbling block was that the Arab MKs voted with the religious
parties and most of the governing coalition on the promise that a bill to draft Arab
citizens, also sponsored by Labour, would be blocked. But what can this have meant
if not that the supposed majority was an artificial one? This majority was only to be
seen if the question of drafting the ultra-orthodox were taken in isolation; but it did
not exist in isolation. There was no majority for the proposition that both Arabs and
ultra-orthodox Jews be drafted, which was the more accurate position of the sponsors
of the Bill. The unwillingness of the sponsors to take into account the position of the
Arab minority lost them their support and their majority. Nor could those in the
governing coalition who, in isolation, may have wanted the ultra-orthodox drafted,
have afforded to lose their support on other issues evidently of greater importance
to them. So, proportional representation provided both a superior picture of majority
will and a superior protection of minority rights than any other electoral system,
much less an abstract opinion survey. This is similar to the most recent capital
punishment debate in Canada's Parliament. A majority of the public and the Mem-
bers of Parliament were said to support capital punishment, but when it came to the
vote, they could not agree on precisely what type of murderer (premeditated, sex,
child, repeat, police, etc.) to execute. Those who wanted one type executed found no
executions at all better than the alternative of executing another type. The majority
was purely abstract and unreal.
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indeed it never was, about democratic procedures ("one person, one
vote"). It is not about means but about ends. The key is not that the
majority rules but that it respects these values. But it is not enough for
this argument to succeed that it be shown that the majority merely
should not violate these values - something easy to accept and a
familiar goal of democratic politics through traditional majoritarian
means - it has to be deduced from this that majorities should not be
allowed to violate them, that there should be some non-majoritarian
mechanism that stands above the majorities and forcibly constrains
them to act democratically. Here is Justice Aharon Barak in his land-
mark decision of 1995 in United Mizrahi Bank:
In this context, endowing the majority with the power to impair the
rights of a minority is an undemocratic act. Protecting individual
rights, minority rights and the fundamental values of the legal
structure against the power of the majority is a democratic act ...
Indeed "true" democracy cannot exist without limitations of the
power of the majority so as to protect the values of the State of Israel
as a Jewish and democratic state, and so as to protect the fundamen-
tal values, of which human rights are primary. Democracy of the
majority alone, unaccompanied by a democracy of values is formal
"statistical" democracy. True democracy limits the power of the
majority in order to protect the values of society ...72
I want to return to this question of the democracy of ends versus the
democracy of means later on, because what is at stake will be clearer
then. But for now, let us pursue the classic defence. The next element
is really the crucial one for the democratic legitimacy of the courts. It
holds that if the majority is to be prevented from trampling on demo-
cratic values, then only a court is capable of doing the preventing. In the
Israeli version of this argument, the court ends up by identifying democ-
racy with itself:
But is judicial review democratic? Is it democratic that the court -
whose judges are not elected by the people and do not represent a
social and political platform - be empowered to invalidate a law
enacted by elected officials? ... The substantive answer is that the
72 United Mizrahi Bank, supra n. 12, at 79-80.
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judicial review of constitutionality is the very essence of democracy,
for democracy does not only connote the rule of the majority. Democ-
racy also means the rule of basic values and human rights as ex-
pressed in the constitution. Democracy is a delicate balance between
majority rule and the basic values of society ... Democracy also means
substantive democracy, which is concerned with the defence of hu-
man rights in particular.
73
To maintain that judicial review is undemocratic is to maintain that
safeguarding human rights is undemocratic. To maintain that judi-
cial review is undemocratic is to maintain that defending the rights
of the individual against the majority is undemocratic.
74
No doubt the Israeli Supreme Court's reputation for delivering demo-
cratic decisions (a matter we explore later) is better deserved than most
constitutional courts, and perhaps that can explain Justice Barak's
permitting himself such an exaggerated claim. But can it really be true
that judicial review is "the very essence of democracy"? Can it be true
that all of the other institutions that encourage and guarantee respect
for democratic values, such as elections, parliaments, parties, unions,
education, media, ad infinitum are non-essential? Can it be true, there-
fore, that until the "constitutional revolution" of 1992 Israel had no
claims to democratic status (or only the minor ones associated with the
Bergman line of decisions), not because of the real deficiencies in human
rights in the country, of which there were many, but because of the lack
of judicial review? And if Israel was not a democracy in 1991, can it be
true that the entrenchment of a few rights in Basic Laws and their
recognition by the courts brought us out of the dark ages of non-
democracy, while everything else - economic, social, political, religious
and racial relations - remained essentially the same?
So let us scale down Justice Barak's claim to something more realistic
and read him to mean that judicial review is an "important" ingredient,
maybe even "one of the essential" ingredients of democracy - the
democracy of ends and not of means. But it is not enough to say that
democracy ultimately requires respect for democratic values to make
the claim for judicial review. It has to be shown why this democracy of
ends is better achieved by the means of judicial review than by the
means of majority rule.
73 Ibid., at 120-121.
74 Ibid., at 123.
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There are two standard responses here. One is a rather formalistic
and tries to avoid the question altogether. Look, it says, the people
themselves, through their legislatures, democratically enacted these
constitutions, put in the important democratic rights and told the courts
to enforce them. What could be more democratic than that? In this
category we can place Justice Barak's statement in the Stockbrokers
case of 1997: "The justification in this is the subordination of the
legislature to the supra-legal constraints which he himself set forth"
(emphasis added).75 From this we can also understand Justice Barak's
call for a referendum on the constitution to consolidate the democratic
mandate.
76
There are several fatal flaws in this short way around the question.
In the first place, the mandate given by legislatures for the act ofjudicial
review is often not clear. So unclear was Israel's constitution on the very
question of its superior validity that it took Justice Barak the longest
opinion in the history of the court to establish it, and even then he didn't
convince the entire court. 7 In fact, on one of the many pages of the
United Mizrahi Bank decision, it is possible to find Justice Barak
praising the courts of "various countries" for not waiting for mere
constitutional texts to bring about their constitutional revolutions:
The fundamental values and basic human rights are so deep and so
important that the courts of various countries are prepared - with-
out any constitutional text - to negate parliamentary power to
impair those values".
7s
Justice Barak knows that constitutions are not like other laws. They
are not meant to be applied literally. The text is only the tiniest part of
75 "Hatsiduk lekach hu b'kfifuto shel hamchokek lehora'ot chukatiot-alchukiot, shehu
atzmo kav'an", Association of Investment Managers, supra n. 14, para. 19. For similar
remarks in the Canadian context see Vriend v. The Queen (Supreme Court of Canada,
April 2, 1998), para. 132. The Canadian Court also marshalled the democracy-of-
ends-not-of-means argument (para. 176).
76 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), June 18, 1998.
77 Klein, supra n. 5, at 134.
78 United Mizrahi Bank, supra n. 12, at 80. For another example see Justice Barak's
minimalization of the importance of the failure to enact a Basic Law on criminal
procedure where constitutional due process is concerned: Aharon Barak, "The
Constitutionalization of the Israeli Legal System as a Result of the Basic Laws and
its effect on Procedural and substantive Criminal Law", (1997) 31 Isr. L.R. 3, at 17.
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the story. And Justice Barak was only being faithful to the dominant
view of constitutional "interpretation" when he defined his task in
United Mizrahi Bank as nothing less than "making sense of the whole
national experience". 79 Now, as anyone who witnessed the controversy
over the fiftieth anniversary television series "Tekumah" on the history
of Israel knows, what the sense of Israel's "whole national experience"
is depends on who is trying to make sense of it. And it has been
conventional wisdom in the legal profession for almost a century that
"the constitution is what the judges say it is".
80
That is why a referendum on the constitution would be something of
a democratic hoax. We had one in Canada on a text so vague it could
not have made the slightest bit of difference to the outcome of any case
and, therefore, gave merely the illusion of participation." A referendum
that ratified either of the Basic Laws would still leave the question of
what "Jewish and democratic" meant, and, therefore, the outcome of any
given case, entirely up to the judges. Judicial review would be no more
democratic because of such a referendum than if the people voted to
hand over power to the army. It might, in some senses, be considered
a democratic act, but it would certainly be the last one.
Judicial "Objectivity"
If the constitution is what the judges say it is, then the question is
a simple one: why should judges be thought to be better at delivering
democratic results than legislatures? The standard response is that,
unlike voters, legislatures and politicians, judges are non-partisan,
neutral and objective. Justice Barak knows that this is a crucial element
of the justification, so he tried his best to convince us of it in United
Mizrahi Bank:
79 United Mizrahi Bank, supra n. 12, at 67. Here Justice Barak was just following
Ronald Dworkin, supra n. 70, at 11, who put it this way: "The moral reading asks
them to find the best conception of constitutional moral principles - the best
understanding of what equal moral status for men and women really requires for
example - that fits the broad story of America's historical record".
80 "We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the Judges say its is".
United States Supreme Court Justice, later Chief Justice, Charles Evans Hughes,
speaking in 1907, to be quoted and popularized by President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
in his radio talk of 1937: David M. O'Brien, ed., Constitutional Law and Politics.
Volume Two: Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (Norton & Co., 2nd ed., 1995) 69.
81 Mandel, supra n. 3, at 106-126.
[Is.L.R. Vol. 33
No. 2, 1999] DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 291
The justification applies when the judiciary gives expression to the
values of society as they are understood by the culture and tradition
of the people as they move forward through history. This justification
does not, however, operate when the judge expresses his subjective
beliefs. Indeed, judicial objectivity is part and parcel of the basis of
judicial review of constitutionality. In granting weight to different
considerations the judge aspires to the best of his ability to achieve
judicial objectivity. He reflects neither his personal values nor his
personal considerations. The judge reflects "the values of the State
of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state".
82
His daily bread is none other than the basic values, which he bal-
ances objectively. He does not seek power, nor does he crave to rule.
He does not seek to impose his personal views on society. He wishes
only to do justice in the case before him and to adjudicate each case
justly. Since the establishment of the State of Israel, the High Court
of Justice has stood - and with it the entire community of Israel -
as the bastion of Israeli democracy ... [and quoting former Supreme
Court Justice Berensohn:] "the court is the most secure and objective
refuge that the citizen has in his dispute with the establishment.8 3
Well, as Marx and Engels once wrote, "every shopkeeper is very well
able to distinguish between what somebody professes to be and what he
really is".8 4 And, in fact, as often as judicial objectivity has been
protested by judges and lawyers, it has been belied by the practice of the
people responsible for setting them up to judge. The device of "concen-
trated"judicial review identified with Hans Kelsen (which Justice Barak
opposes) takes judicial review out of the hands of the ordinary courts
and places it in the exclusive jurisdiction of specially appointed, politi-
cally sensitive, constitutional tribunals. It was adopted by most of the
countries that form part of what Justice Barak calls the "community of
democratic countries ... with constitutional bills of rights" that Israel
82 United Mizrahi Bank, supra n. 12, at 126.
83 Ibid., at 127.
84 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology [1846] (Progress Publishers,
1976), 70-71: "Whilst in ordinary life every shopkeeper is very well able to distinguish
between what somebody professes to be and what he really is, our historiography has
not yet won this trivial insight. It takes every epoch at its word and believes that
everything it says and imagines about itself is true".
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joined in 1992.85 They adopted that system precisely to obviate the
biases of ordinary judiciary: in post-World War I Austria, to avoid the
imperial judges who proved so friendly to the right-wing militias; in
Germany, Italy, Spain and South Africa, to circumvent the judges
trained under Nazism, Fascism and Apartheid. Even in the United
States, everybody understood the determined and successful efforts of
successive Republican administrations of the 1980s to appoint conserva-
tive judges, and of President Clinton to do the opposite in the 1990s. The
periodic U.S. Senate grillings of potential candidates (such as the world-
famous Thomas/Hill confrontations of 1991) would be impossible to
comprehend if it were all merely a good-hearted, non-partisan search for
the person best able to put their personal values aside. Nor would it be
possible to understand the wild swings in the jurisprudence of the
United States Supreme Court, if it were all merely a matter of judges
doing their best to objectively interpret the same constitution and the
record of American history. In Canada, the metaphor of the "leaning
tower of Pisa" is used to describe what happens when the federal
government appoints all of the judges of the courts that adjudicate its
jurisdictional disputes with the provincial government of Quebec.
It is on this crucial question of objectivity that the Israeli court is, in
fact, most vulnerable. For instance, the following item appeared in the
Ha'aretz of February 4, 1998:
During a debate on "the undermining of faith in the judicial system"
Tuesday, Yitzhak Cohen of Shas declared: "The percentage of
Sephardim in this country is over 65 percent, and in the nature of
things, they are either religious or traditional. In contrast, the judi-
cial system is an Ashkenazi system in terms of ethnic composition:
Over 85 percent of the holders of judicial posts are Ashkenazi. They
are all secular. The Supreme Court is almost entirely Ashkenazi".
Cohen charged that a situation has been created in which those on
the bench are Ashkenazi and those in the dock are Sephardi - "just
like the relations of horse and rider".
"If judges see themselves as fit to legislate - what is known in low
Israeli slang as 'judicial activism', as if the use of the foreign term is
enough to change the facts - even though they were not chosen for
this by the populace, it is impossible not to say that they see them-
85 United Mizrahi Bank, supra n. 12, at 1.
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selves as gods. We have before us a new form of idol worship, no less
damaging and dangerous than its primitive predecessors. The MKs,
politicians, public figures and writers who see everything that comes
out of the High Court of Justice's mouth as the word of God are the
high priests of this modern, primitive idol worship".,
6
This episode was just part of a general assault on the objectivity of
the courts by the Sephardi and religious parties. One of the country's
most influential Sephardi Rabbis went so far as to say that the judg-
ments of the Supreme Court were "worse than the laws of the goyim",
which, in the context of Israeli politics, was just a way of drawing
attention to the fact that the judges are secular.8 7 The most famous
statement on the lack of judicial objectivity was that of Arieh Deri MK,
leader of the Sephardi religious party Shas, who said that he "would
even oppose the enactment of the Ten Commandments as a basic law
for fear of how the court might interpret it".88
A few months after the Shas attack, the complaint was raised a notch
higher to the level of Deputy Minister for Religious Affairs Yigal Bibi
of the National Religious Party (Zionist orthodox), who defended the
rabbinical courts by comparing them with the civil courts thus:
I recommend that the Knesset discuss the state we have reached in
Israel, where there is no law and no justice, only miscarriage of
justice. People don't go to court because they know there is no justice.
Whoever sees what goes on in the Supreme Court, where cases wait
for years, will learn that it is all judicial activism. Everything is open;
everything is justiciable. If the Supreme Court continues to fail to
uphold the law, we will have to pass a law requiring the court to judge
according to the law ... Listen to the jurists - not to me. Listen to
what the best jurists say. I organized a conference ofjurists. They are
shocked by what is going on. There is no judicial system ... It's time
to say that the emperor is naked".
8 9
Comments like these have clearly hit a nerve. Not only have defend-
ers of the court impugned the critics' personal credibility, which is only
86 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), February 4, 1998, at 1.
87 "Hebrew-speakinggoyim" is the way one religious politician described secular Jews.
88 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), February 6, 1998, at 1.
89 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), June 10, 1998, at 1.
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fair,90 they have also demanded their punishment, charging them with
"subverting the judicial system [and thereby] eroding the strength of
Israeli democracy and indeed of society and the state".91 They have even
accused the critics of endangering judges' lives.
92
But, not only do the critics have a strong factual basis for their claims
in the ethnic and religious demography of the judiciary,93 they are also
merely expressing, as the Deputy Minister correctly pointed out, the
conventional scholarly wisdom of almost a century.94 Furthermore, it is
difficult not to sympathize with the frustration of the religious and
Sephardi parties. No sooner have they succeeded in gaining some lev-
erage for themselves in the parliamentary enterprise, no sooner have
they learned how to use it to redirect some of the largesse of the state
in their direction and to the realization of their values, than the tradi-
tional elites seek to turn the tables on them by changing the constitu-
tional rules of the game - in other words, to change everything so that
everything remains the same. At first sight this seems not at all dissimi-
lar to the legitimate frustration of nationalist Quebeckers in Canada,
who, as soon as they started to use their constitutional power to correct
the imbalance between themselves and English Canada, found the
constitution changed against their will and all resulting disputes as-
signed to the courts appointed by their English Canadian adversaries.
90 Deri himself has been charged with several counts of corruption and editorialist Ze'ev
Segal argued in Ha'aretz a few days after the outburst by Cohen that Shas was
merely trying "to trample faith in the legal system - the same legal system in which
several Shas members have been interrogated, suspected and charged with offences":
Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), February 8, 1998, at 6.
91 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), June 11, 1998, at 6.
92 Ze'ev Segal, "Judges in the crosshairs", Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), May 25, 1998, at 6. Justice
Barak was subject to a particularly crude death threat in 1996 from a telephone caller
who said: "You'll rot next to Rabin's grave, then you will understand". He now has
a 24-hour armed guard: Gilbert, supra n. 32, at 595. See also Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), June
12, 1998, at 3.
93 Klein, supra n. 5, at 143.
94 See supra n. 80.
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The Difference with Israel
Undemocratic Legislators
But there is at least one big difference here between Quebec and
Israel and it lies in the peculiarity of Israeli politics. Unlike French
Quebeckers - unlike, indeed, all the working classes who had the
constitutional tables turned on them this century - the religious and
Sephardi parties are hard to accept as the bearers of democratic values.
Though their electoral base is in Israel's propertyless classes, in many
respects their platforms hold out the promise of only more inequality:
sexual, religious, racial, and even, in their alliance with the Right, class
inequality. Their strength is somewhat of an anomaly among the devel-
oped countries of the world and it has to do with Israel's unique history:
a state settled and dominated by immigrants from highly developed
Western countries which nevertheless depended for its existence on the
integration of a large mass of immigrants from underdeveloped Eastern
countries; the centrality of the Jewish religion in the official state ethos
and the consequent unusual proportion of the state's resources devoted
to the encouragement of religious institutions and communities; a per-
manent state of war, a large alien minority and a long territorial
occupation that easily lend themselves to an authoritarian and racist
mentality. 95
Everyone has heard of Shas leader Arieh Deri's comment about how
he would not trust the Court even if the Ten Commandments were
written into the constitution, 96 but his subsequent apology to Justice
Barak for such harsh criticism is much less well known. Deri said of
Barak that "if he were a yeshiva student, there is no doubt that we
would be dealing with the greatest figure of this generation".97 As
someone with more than a passing personal familiarity with the Yeshiva
95 According to a 1992 poll, only 40% of the ultra-orthodox appear to think that a
democratic government they disagree with is preferable to a non-democratic govern-
ment, while seculars favour democracy by 73% and observant Jews who are not ultra-
orthodox favour democracy by 60%. The same discrepancies can be seen in attitudes
to Arabs. Agreement with the statement 'the State of Israel belongs to the Jews and
only to the Jews" was expressed by 76% of the ultra-orthodox, 56% of observant Jews
and 28% of secular Jews: Ha'aretz (Eng ed.), June 2, 1998, at 3.
96 See supra n. 88.
97 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), March 26, 1998, at 1.
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and an increasing familiarity with the courts, Deri is well placed to
understand their similarities. Sacred texts are what their interpreters
say they are, whether they are rabbis or judges.9 8 The specific Israeli
dilemma in constitutional politics is that we are caught between the
devil and the deep blue sea, not to mention the frying pan and the fire.
The alternative to the characteristic modern legal obscurantism of the
courts is the ancient ultra-orthodox religious obscurantism of the rabbis.
It's either dissenting judges or disputing rabbis to solve our problems
for us by pulling the answers out of ambiguous texts like rabbits (chas
v'chalila!) out of hats.
"Democratic" Judges
But it would be false to put the alternatives in such an equivalent
manner, because there is yet another important peculiarity about Is-
rael: the tendency of the Supreme Court, when it intervenes, to inter-
vene on the side of democracy - to favour equality where the religious
parties seek to impose a radical inequality.
We have already mentioned the Bergman line of cases in which the
Court held that the method of financing parties according to their
representation in the outgoing, as opposed to the incoming, Knesset
discriminated against new parties.99 Naturally this put the newer,
smaller parties in a better, more equal position - though the impact
should not be exaggerated, as the court-approved system still tended to
reinforce inequality by authorizing more money for the older, bigger
parties.
98 The story is told of Moses when he received the laws of kashrut from the Lord on
Mount Sinai. Moses was particularly troubled when the Lord intoned "THOU SHALT
NOT SEETHE A KID IN ITS MOTHER'S MILK. "Does that mean", Moses asked,
"that we can't eat milk and meat at the same time?" The Lord, evidently frustrated,
replied: "MOSES, LISTEN TO WHAT I'M SAYING: THOU SHALT NOT SEETHE
A KID IN ITS MOTHER'S MILK. Moses, still puzzled, reflected and then ventured:
"Okay, I think I've got it now. We have to wait three hours after eating meat before
drinking milk and one hour after drinking milk before eating meat?" The thundering
voice of the Lord came back: "MOSES! LISTEN TO MY VOICE: THOU SHALT NOT
SEETHE A KID IN ITS MOTHER'S MILK! Moses, now very excited: "Okay, okay,
now I've got it for sure. We have to keep separate sets of dishes for milk products
and separate sets for meat products and they have to be washed separately and ... "
-MOSES! ... OH, ALL RIGHT, HAVE IT YOUR WAY ..."
99 Supra n. 6.
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However, most of the Court's democratic activism has been in the
exercise of its traditional, common law powers, not to overrule the
legislature, but to operate in the many gaps left by it, powers which let
the Court decide, but which leave the legislature legally free to disagree.
Here the Court's interventions in favour of democracy have been numer-
ous.
For example, the Supreme Court has been much praised for its
actions in defence of "freedom of speech". As long ago as 1953, it
overturned suspensions of a Communist Party newspaper critical of
government's stance against Soviet Union in the famous Kol Ha'am
case °0 and in 1989 it overturned a ban on a newspaper article critical
of Israel's secret service. 1 1 The Court has also been praised for acting
in favour of the democratic principle of government obedience to law. In
1990, it overturned the government's decision not to prosecute bankers
involved in illegal practices that led to a stock market crisis, holding
that the government had taken an unreasonable view of the "public
interest" and ordering a reconsideration.'0 2 In 1993 the Court overruled
Prime Minister Rabin's decision not to remove Arieh Deri as Minister
of Interior after Deri had been indicted for corruption, holding, once
again, that the Prime Minister had misused his discretion.10 3 Prior to
that, it acted in favour of the democratic principle of "transparency" by
affirming the duty of a government to publish its coalition agreements
when it presented itself to the Knesset.
0 4
The Court has also intervened on behalf of sexual equality, striking
out as discriminatory the retirement provisions in collective agreements
that forced women to retire five years earlier than men,' 5 holding that
gay couples are entitled to spousal pension benefits 0 6 and that women
100 Kol Ha'am Company Limited v. Minister of Interior in Zamir and Zysblat, supra
n. 5.
101 Meir Schnitzer and Others v. The Chief Military Censor and Others (1989), English
translation in Zamir and Zysblat, supra n. 5, at 108.
102 Uri Ganor, Advocate and others v. The Attorney General (1990), ibid., at 334.
103 The Movement for Quality in Government in Israel & Others (1993) 47(v) P.D. 404,
10 Selected Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel 258.
104 Shalit v. Peres & Others (1990) 44(iii) P.D. 353, 10 Selected Judgments of the
Supreme Court of Israel 204.
105 Nevo v. National Labour Court and Others (1990) 44(iv) P.D. 749, 10 Selected
Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel 136.
106 El Al v. Danilevitch (1994) 48(v) P.D. 749, discussed in Klein, supra n. 5, at 140,
ISRAEL LAW REVIEW
may not be disqualified from religious councils or election committees
for local rabbis.
10 7
The religious council cases are also important examples of the Court's
defence of religious pluralism, as are its invalidation of the disqualifi-
cation of Reform and Conservative Jews from religious councils as
violating the principle of equality,108 and its barring of the Rabbinate
from using its authority to grant kashrut certificates to coerce adher-
ence to other aspects of religious law. 10 9 The Court has ordered the
government to allocate land for the establishment of secular cemeter-
ies," 0 and it has ordered municipal authorities to grant a performance
licence for a Christian missionary film."' On the question of "Who is a
Jew?" for the purposes of the automatic right to citizenship under the
Law of Return, the Court first rejected the rabbinical definition for a
much broader, secular one, and then, when the law was amended and
the rabbinical definition was introduced, the Court interpreted the word
"conversion" to include non-orthodox conversions. 112
Even in the treatment of Arabs, where the court has been criticized
for having "a sense of law and justice that stops at the Green Line,"
1 13
the Court has a number of positive interventions to its credit. In a
famous case in 1979 (the "Elon Moreh" case), the Court overturned the
establishment of a Gush Emunin settlement on Arab land, holding the
military governor's security reasons merely a pretext for political rea-
107 Shakdiel v. Minister for Religious Affairs (1988) 42(ii) P.D. 221 (abridged in 24 Isr.
L.R. 129); Poraz v. Mayor of Tel Aviv (1988) 42(ii) P.D. 307.
108 Hoffman v. City Council of Jerusalem (1994) 48(i) P.D. 678. See also recently the
decision of the High Court of Justice reported in Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), November 24,
1998.
109 Raskin v. Religious Council of Jerusalem (1990) 44(ii) P.D. 673 (abridged in 26 Isr.
L.R. 77).
110 Menucha Nechona Society v. Minister of Religious Affairs H.C. 397/88.
111 The Galilee Experience v. Mayor of Tiberias (1991) 45(iv) P.D. 58.
112 Hitachdut Hasefaredim Shomrei Torah v. Director of Population Registry (1989)
43() P.D. 727 discussed in David Kretzmer, "Constitutional Law", in Amos Shapira
and Keren C. DeWitt-Arar, eds., Introduction to the Law of Israel (Kluwer Law
International, 1995) 39, at 43.
113 Gideon Levy, Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), January 25, 1998, at 6. See, also, Klein, supra n.
5, at 140, n. 2 ("on a pu dire que l'activisme de la Cour supreme s'arretait e la ligne
verte") and Tom Segev, Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), February 6, 1998 at 8: "As it approaches
its 50th birthday, it should be commended for its positions on civil rights, but it must
be said that the court does not do a good job defending the human rights of Arab
residents of the territories".
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sons.1 14 The Court has stopped some proposed demolitions of Palestinian
homes on the grounds of suspected involvement of residents in terrorist
activities, holding that the principle of proportionality required the
government to use its lesser powers of sealing a house pending the
outcome of investigations.115 During the Gulf War of 1991, the Court
ordered the government gas mask distribution programme to be ex-
tended to Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.1 1 6 The Court has also
acted against discrimination against Israeli Arabs, holding, for in-
stance, that an Arab juvenile could not be denied access to special
juvenile facility as an alternative to prison just because a separate one
for Arabs had not been built yet." 7
The Limits of Judicial Democracy
So the Israeli Court has quite a few democratic interventions to its
credit. Nevertheless, it would be a great exaggeration to say that it has
been a fearless and consistent defender of democracy. There are many
cases in which, just like other courts around the world, it has refused
to intervene when the authorities have acted undemocratically. For
example, despite the interventions just mentioned, the Court has earned
its bad reputation on Arab rights in the Occupied Territories by a series
of decisions not to intervene. For example, it has refused to intervene
in the demolition of houses on the basis of the reasonableness or legiti-
macy of the practice as a form of collective punishment, as opposed to
its procedural correctness in a given case;"' and it gave a narrow
reading to the Geneva Convention in refusing to interfere with
deportations of Arab residents suspected of hostile activity against the
114 Izat Muhamed Mustafa Dwaikat and others v. The State of Israel and others (the
"Elon Moreh Case") (1979) Zamir and Zysblat, supra n. 5, at 379.
115 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Central District Commander and Another
(1989), 9 Selected Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel 1; Turkeman v. Minister
of Defence (1994) 48(i) P.D. 217.
116 Morcus v. Minister of Defence (1991) 45(i) P.D. 467.
117 National Council for the Child's Welfare v. Minister of Labour and Welfare (1993)
47(i) P.D. 148, discussed in Asher Maoz, "Constitutional Law", in I. Zamir and S.
Colombo, eds., The Law of Israel: General Surveys (Sacher Institute for Legislative
Research on Comparative Law) 5.
118 David Kretzmer, "Forty Years of Public Law", (1990), 24 Isr. L.R. 341, at 355, n. 54.
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occupying authorities,1 19 even when these were done in violation of the
principles of due process. 120 The Court has upheld the policy of selling
apartments in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem only to
Jews 12 1 and the banning of an Arab Nationalist Party from standing for
election because it repudiated Israel's right to exist,122 but denying that
the same principle applied to Jewish parties advocating racism.
23
On the question of religious pluralism, the Court has refused to
interfere with the orthodox monopoly on performing marriages,' 24 and
has repeatedly denied petitions by reservists who claimed that the




So, alongside the court's interventions on behalf of democracy there
have been many failures to intervene that have upheld undemocratic
governmental practices. In this, Israel's Supreme Court is like many
other constitutional courts throughout the world. However, what is
really unique about Israel's Supreme Court, modest though it may
appear, is its almost complete lack of undemocratic interventions, that
is decisions which, by overturning democratic government initiatives,
have actually made matters worse. One cannot find instances, such as
those which litter the law reports of other countries, of the Supreme
Court interfering with government attempts to limit and regulate the
power of property, to take the workers' side in labour relations, or to
correct historical imbalances by affirmative action programmes. Af-
119 Asser Al Aziz, Ald Al Aziz, Abd Al Afri and others v. Commander of IDF Forces in
the Judea and Samaria Region (1988), Zamir and Zysblat, supra n. 5, at 410.
120 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence (1993) 47(ii) P.D. 267; 10
Selected Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel 168. However it must be said that
in this case the Court granted a retrospective right to an in-person hearing for those
wishing to have one, even if the application was made from outside Israel.
121 Burkan v. Minister of Finance (1978) 32(ii) P.D. 800.
122 Yeredor v. Chairmen of the Central Elections Committee for the Sixth Knesset (1965)
19(iii) P.D. 365, discussed in David Kretzmer, supra n. 112, at 41.
123 Neiman v. Chairmen of Central Elections a Committee for the 11th Knesset (1984)
39(ii) P.D. 225, discussed in Claude Klein, "The Defence of the State and the
Democratic Regime in the Supreme Court", (1985) 20 Isr. L.R. 397.
124 Movement for Progressive Judaism in Israel Fund v. Minister of Religious Affairs
(1989) 43(ii) P.D. 661 abridged in (1991) 25 Isr. L.R. 110.
125 Ressler & Others v. Minister of Defence (1988) 42(ii) P.D. 441; 10 Selected Judgments
of the Supreme Court of Israel 1. In December, 1998 the Supreme Court ruled the
discrimination formally illegal without taking a position on the merits. This is
discussed below.
[Is.L.R. Vol. 33
No. 2, 1999] DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 301
firmative action in favour of women has been left judicially unharmed
126
and the Court has resisted the call to interfere with the rare cases of
discrimination in favour of Arabs. 127 The only important cases of un-
democratic interventions by the Supreme Court have been with respect
to freedom of speech for Jewish racists, when, in the 1980s, the Court
upheld the complaints of Rabbi Meir Kahane and his racist "Kach"
movement against censorship by the Broadcasting Authority, 12 and
against the banning of his party by the Knesset Elections Committee.
129
So the democratic credentials of the Supreme Court of Israel are
much better than those of most other constitutional courts in the world,
because the Israeli Court's significant democratic interventions, while
keeping company with many refusals to intervene in the undemocratic
behaviour of the government, are not as usual outweighed by anti-
democratic interventions against government. On balance, therefore, it
is hard to avoid the conclusion, unique as it is, that the Supreme Court
of Israel's interventions have done more democratic good than harm.
Does this prove Justice Barak's thesis about judicial review and the
"democracy of ends"?
Not quite.
126 For example the Government Companies Law of 1975 (as amended in 1993) provides
for affirmative action for women in the directorships of public companies. Opposition
to discrimination against women can be found in the earliest legislation of the State.
E.g., the Women Equal Rights Law, 1951 (5 L.S.I. 171) provided that "any provision
of law which discriminates, with regard to any legal act, against women as women,
shall be of no effect".
127 Avitan v. Israel Lands Administration (1989) 43(iv) P.D. 297, discussed in Maoz,
supra n. 117, at 32, in which discrimination in favour of Bedouins over Jews in the
matter of subsidized land was upheld.
128 Member of Knesset Rabbi Meir Kahane and the "Kach" Movement v. The Executive
Board of the Broadcasting Authority and Others (1985) Zamir and Zysblat, supra n.
5, at 74.
129 Neiman et al., supra n. 123. To these cases, one might perhaps add the much milder
one of Universal City Studios Inc. & Others v. Film & Theatre Censorship Board &
Others (1989) 43(ii) P.D. 22, 10 Selected Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel
229, where the Court overturned the ban on the film "The Last Temptation of Christ"
which offended many Christians, as well as being a thoroughly bad movie.
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The Great Constitutional Revolution Ushers in a Timid Court
In the first place, it bears repeating that most of the Court's demo-
cratic activity has come within the confines of the "rule of law" as
traditionally understood, that is, ensuring the government's compliance
with enacted law, or filling in the gaps where parliament has failed to
legislate. That is, almost all of the activity for which the court deserves
praise comes within traditional notions of the division of powers and
outside the realm of modern constitutionalism.' 31 Secondly, there seems
to be a temporal dimension involved: however effective and activist it
may have been before it, since the much-heralded "constitutional revo-
lution," the Court seems to have become relatively timid and ineffective.
Having established its authority, it seems hesitant to use it. Some critics
have attributed this to the high profile the constitutional revolution
itself has bestowed, and the Court's consequent vulnerability to a demo-
cratic critique and the charges of bias outlined earlier.'
Nothing could be a better example of judicial ineffectiveness than
Meatrael v. Rabin itself, the 1992 decision on the importation of non-
kosher meat: it was legislatively overruled without even a whimper,
and, indeed, with the votes of several secular MKs. 132 Similarly incon-
sequential was the court's intervention in 1996 on the explosive ques-
tion of whether a major thoroughfare in Jerusalem which passed through
an ultra-orthodox area should be closed on the Sabbath. A government
with heavy religious participation had ordered it closed, and the court
130 This is also the case for several recent high-profile interventions: the disqualification
of a Jewish party from running in municipal elections on the grounds of racism
reported in Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), October 30, 1998, was a straightforward application
of the Municipal Elections Act. The acquittal of kibbutzniks for charges of working
on the Sabbath used traditional rules of statutory interpretation (Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.),
December 6, 1998).
131 Alon Harel, "The Rule of law in Israel: Philosophical Aspirations and Institutional
Realities" (1998, unpublished manuscript in the possession of the author) at 7:
"Others believe that a written constitution may lead to greater caution on the part
of the judges and therefore may eventually be detrimental to the protection of human
rights ... Courts which have to defend their very constitutional powers to review
statutes are less able vigorously to defend human rights. Ironically, it is therefore
the Courts' declaration of de jure constitutional power which weakens their de facto
political power and consequently undermines their ability and commitment to the
protection of human rights".
132 See supra nn. 7 and 8.
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issued a temporary injunction. However, the court's ultimate decision
was limited to brokering a compromise that would allow the orthodox
to shut the street down "during prayer hours".
Predictions as to what posture the Court might take on religious
pluralism in the future under the Basic Laws would be foolhardy. The
texts, as all constitutional texts, are completely indeterminate. On the
other hand, the relentless pressure of the religious sector is starting to
show. Justice Barak has taken to including somewhat gratuitous reli-
gious references in his decisions under the Basic Laws. In United
Mizrahi Bank he ended with this:
The prospect is the ascent of the glory of human rights, and increased
goodwill and fellowship among humans, each born in the image of the
Creator. 133
In the Stockbrokers case he referred to the Mishna of Rabbi Eliezer:
"The trade distinguishes the person and constitutes an expression of
God (Elohim) in him".1 3 4 After the attack on the Supreme Court for
interfering with the Rabbinical Courts, Justice Barak went out of his
way to praise their work. 135 Despite the control exercised by the legal
profession over new recruits, the religious conversion of society cannot
leave the courts immune. In March of 1998, a religiously observant
District Judge held that the prohibition of the sale of non-kosher meat
in a secular neighbourhood of Ashkelon was consistent with the values
of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.
1 3 6
Justice Barak recently issued an expectation-lowering "clarification"
of his famous dictum that "everything can be adjudicated:"
I always claimed that 'the law is everything' (in the spirit of the
biblical injunction) but I never claimed that everything was juridical
(meaning that it can or should be adjudicated). Not everything is
suitable for resolution by the courts. 3 '
133 United Mizrahi Bank, supra n. 12, at 163.
134 Association of Investment Management, supra n. 14, at paragraph 15.
135 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), June 17, 1998, at 1.
136 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), March 11, 1998, at 1.
137 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), July 24, 1998, at 6.
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A few months after this, the Court delivered its judgment on the draft
exemptions of ultra-orthodox Yeshiva students, holding that the fifty-
year old practice (repeatedly upheld by the Court in the past) was illegal
because it had been adopted by executive decision and not legislative
enactment. The Court gave the legislature one year to pass a law to deal
with the question one way or another. In the unanimous decision by an
unprecedented eleven-member panel, the court expressly took no posi-
tion on the merits of the exemption. Indeed it exalted the role of the
Knesset in deciding questions of such importance. The decision left the
Knesset absolutely free to do what the political forces dictated. The
lobbying began immediately. Meretz proposed to reduce the exemption
from the current 31,000 annually to where it stood before the Right took
power, at 800. A cross-party compromise was shaping up that would
leave some form of special treatment in place for all the Yeshiva stu-
dents, with special paramilitary units and training in vacation. The
press reported that most politicians were satisfied. Secular supporters
called it "cleverly crafted judicial restraint";138 secular critics called it
"cowardly" - a way to legalize an illegal practice. 139 According to one
Yeshiva student interviewed in the street: "It's all hot air and nothing
will come of it".
140
So the willingness of the Court to stand up for the secular cause is
far from given. And even if the courts were willing to set their faces
against religious coercion, the very weak rigidity of the Basic Laws in
the reality of Israeli politics would not pose any serious obstacles to the
religious sector having its way.
If, on religious issues, the question is whether the Court can main-
tain its good reputation, on the question of the treatment of the Arabs,
the question is whether the Court can overcome its bad one. In March
1998, the Supreme Court deeply shocked its defenders by making
partially public a ruling that it was permissible for the State to hold
138 Ze'ev Segal, "Cleverly crafted judicial restraint", Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), December 10,
1998.
139 Orit Shohat, "A cowardly decision", Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), December 11, 1998.
140 The Jerusalem Post, December 10, 1998. Other recent examples of judicial reticence
are the refusal to intervene in the appointment of a Shas MK with a criminal record
to the Chair of a Knesset committee (Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), October 20, 1998) and the
rejection of a petition to provide handicapped voters with access to polling stations
(Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), October 30, 1998).
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Lebanese civilians hostage as bargaining cards for possible prisoner
exchanges. According to the evidence, twenty-one such hostages were
being held, some for several years. The hostages themselves posed no
threat to security nor were they guilty of any wrongdoing. Justice Barak
wrote for the two judges in the majority:
I am convinced that detentions of individuals for the sake of freeing
our missing and captured men constitutes a vital interest of the state
... There is no denying the fact that Israel is in a state of emergency
due to the threats hovering over its existence and citizens from
within and from abroad ... In situations like this, damage to basic
human rights is obligatory. Sometimes even grave and painful dam-
age.
141
The case did not even involve a question of the Basic Laws overruling
a clear legislative directive; it was just a matter of interpreting the rules
for administrative detention. The dissenting Justice Dorner held that
there was not enough proof that the detention would help achieve any
legitimate ends. According to a commentator in Ha'aretz:
Now the Supreme Court has put its stamp of approval on a new
disgrace. Justice Barak has once again proved that when the Su-
preme Court deals with security matters, he will condone almost
automatically any human rights violation, regardless of the moral
cost. 142
Another matter that has provoked world-wide criticism is the Court's
treatment of the physical abuse of Palestinian prisoners by Israeli
authorities. In 1987 a retired President of the Supreme Court, Justice
Moshe Landau, recommended that the Shin Bet internal security serv-
ice be allowed to use "moderate physical pressure" including "rough
shaking" to obtain information in urgent cases where this was necessary
to prevent terrorism. The Supreme Court has frequently been criticized
for its acceptance of the practice and its refusal to hold the security
services to high standards of proof. In May 1998 the United Nations
Committee Against Torture condemned Israel for the use of methods
141 International Herald Tribune, March 5, 1998, at 1.
142 Gideon Levy, Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), March 8, 1998, at 6.
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that contravene the International Convention on Torture.' The Asso-
ciation for Civil Rights in Israel had submitted several petitions against
the practice, and the Court, after previously issuing temporary injunc-
tions but ultimately ratifying every case, held full hearings in May 1998.
Witnesses testified to being forced to wear hoods soaked in vomit or
urine and being shaken violently, bound and gagged in painful posi-
tions, deprived of sleep and subjected to blasts of cold air and loud music.
The evidence submitted to the Court was that 85% of 1000-1500 Pales-
tinians detained were subjected to torture. At least one death had
occurred due to "rough shaking".
14 4
Finally, there is the question of "civil" discrimination against Pales-
tinians, even those who are citizens of the State of Israel. Discrimination
in public education allocations and services has compounded the poverty
of Arab citizens, who have to endure twice the national poverty rate. 145
While the courts have intervened at the margins (ordering a speed-up
in the inclusion of Arabic on inter-city road signs and the provision of
electricity to Bedouin schools' 41), questions that go to the heart of the
conflict, such as budgetary allocations and, especially, the question of
land, have been carefully avoided.
Given the territorial struggle that has characterized the history of
the region, it not surprising that the most sensitive disputes have been
over land and housing. There is mounting evidence of the discriminatory
enforcement of building by-laws in the destruction of houses built
without permits. According to one estimation, though Arabs account for
57% of illegal construction, 90% of demolitions are of Arab housing.' 47
Part of the reason appears to be that illegal housing built by Jews is
often condoned after the fact. 48 Moreover, the relatively high rate of
Arab poverty means the community is exposed to a relatively high rate
of housing problems compared to Jews. 14 9 The details of some of these
143 International Herald Tribune, May 19, 1998, at 3.
144 International Herald Tribune, May 21, 1998, at 10. In September 1999, as I corrected
the page proofs to this article, the Supreme Court finally ordered what amounted to
a temporary stop to the practice of torturing prisoners. The decision is discussed
below.
145 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), November 27, 1998 reported that the poverty rate for 1997 among
non-jews was 30.3%, compared to a poverty rate for the total population of 16.2%.
146 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), November 27, 1998.
147 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), April 7, 1998, at 6.
148 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), April 9, 1998, at 6.
149 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), March 17, 1998, at 2; April 7, 1998, at 6.
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figures have been disputed but not the substance.15 ° The government
admittedly favours Jews over Arabs in leasing land as part of the age-
old Zionist policy that goes to the very nature of the State. One device
used is for the State to transfer public land to the Jewish Agency which
then, according to its mandate, leases only to Jews.' A challenge to this
practice was brought to Court in 1988 by an Israeli Arab family denied
permission to lease land reserved for Jews. The lawyer cited Brown v.
School Board, but, according to a report on the story in the International
Herald Tribune, Justice Barak "pleaded" with both sides to find a
compromise and said it was "one of the most difficult and complex
judicial decisions that I have ever come across". 152 A Ha'aretz editorial
condemned the Court's hesitation in these terms:
The couple's case has been pending before the High Court for three
years. Justice Aharon Barak, sitting at the head of five justices,
asked the state to solve the problem out of court several weeks ago
so it would not be forced to render a ruling or set a precedent on a
sensitive issue. Barak's assumption that the Israeli public was not
"mature" enough for a ruling in principle is odd. 153
The Plot So Far
So Israeli constitutionalism has to account for a goodly and increas-
ing number of failures to oppose the undemocratic actions of govern-
ment, even though it has (like the other constitutionalisms around the
world) some significant democratic interventions to its credit. As we
argued earlier, Israel also fits the traditional anti-democratic model in
its origins "pretty well". However, it offers one significant peculiarity in
its practice, namely a unique absence of undemocratic judicial interven-
tions. Though this may seem a small thing, it does mean that the claim
that the court has done more democratic good than harm, if based only
on the decided cases, might well have to be conceded. Whether this
would put a dent in the anti-democratic thesis of modern constitution-
alism or could be considered an exception explained by the exceptional
nature of Israeli politics would be another question.
150 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), April 9, 1998, at 2.
151 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), March 10, 1998, at 6; March 13, 1998, at 1.
152 International Herald Tribune, March 2, 1998, at 2.
153 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), March 29, 1988, at 6 ("The 'nation' in discrimination").
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But this, at least, is one question we do not have to explore, because
there are more ways that constitutionalism can damage democracy than
by anti-democratic judicial decisions, and Israel is no exception.
Legal politics is not like other politics, even though it is not quite as
different as it likes to pretend. No doubt its protestations about being
"the essence of democracy" and eating a "daily bread" of "objectivity"
contribute to the notion that it is an omnipotent body inhabiting an
autonomous realm; but in fact it has a very limited ambit within which
to operate, tightly circumscribed by the political climate of the country.
There is even an encoded judicial etiquette for this: "the judiciary gives
expression to the values of society as they are understood by the culture
and tradition of the people as they move forward through history".
5 4
Why should the court be so limited? Nothing technical here. Nothing
to do with the open-ended documents it administers. The limits on the
Court have to do with its inherent legitimacy problems. These are
unavoidable for any court and especially one in a "rifted" society, like
Israel. 151 This leads inevitably to the Court agreeing with the legislature
almost all of the time, with cases of disagreement, though much cel-
ebrated, being rare and limited. This has also been the case in Israel,
even outside the Basic Laws in the rule-of-law realms where the courts
have been most active. The difference in Israel is not quantitative but
qualitative, with judicial disagreements tending to be on the side of
democracy and not against it, as opposed to most of the world's consti-
tutional courts. But it also bears emphasizing that it is impossible to
predict how long this will last. Some of the most reactionary courts have
had their good periods. The Supreme Court of the United States from
1954-1973 is a good example. After this twenty-year liberal interval it
resumed the position to the right of government that it had occupied for
a century and a half and has stayed there ever since.
In other words, the Israeli court's apparent timidity and ineffective-
ness come with the territory of a constitutional court.
154 United Mizrahi Bank, supra n. 12, at 126. An obvious example of the dependence of
the Court on the legislature for political direction is the equality case of Nevo
(women's age of retirement), supra n. 105, which merely applied the Knesset initia-
tive of the Equal Age of Retirement for Men and Women (1987) retroactively.
155 Ruth Gavison, "The Role of Courts in Rifted Democracies", a paper delivered in
Jerusalem at the International Colloquium "Democracy and the Courts sponsored
jointly by the Faculty of Law of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Isr. L.R.,
June 30, 1998.
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This has a number of very important results. In the first place, going
to court will often be a concrete waste of time. Most lawyers know this,
even if they do not always let their clients in on the secret. Political
litigation is usually justified not on the chances of winning, but on the
"educational" value, the contribution made to the wider political strug-
gle by going to court to make a moral point against the government. But
this is not one of those "win-win" situations. The considerable resources
expended on judicial campaigns will always drain resources from these
wider political struggles - though they certainly help to improve the
resources of the lawyers involved in the legal campaigns, as well as their
visibility. Often, moreover, it will serve to confuse and dissipate the
political campaign itself.
The way this works is illustrated by the episode of the 1998 bill to
draft Yeshiva students. At the very moment when this apparently
hastily prepared, half-hearted and clumsy political effort was being
debated in the Knesset,156 the very same issue was being debated in the
Supreme Court, which hemmed and hawed over whether it had the
right to intervene. There can be no question that the simultaneous
courtroom battle took the momentum, urgency and effort out of the
Knesset initiative. And when the court finally decided, it took no posi-
tion on the merits but merely pronounced that the Knesset should
pronounce. Granted it set a time limit, but the issue would ultimately
have to be decided according to the balance of political forces in the
country. So the judicial manoeuverings turned out to be a grand detour.
Another example was the proposed Basic Law on Freedom of Religion.
As an attention grabber on the issue of religious pluralism it made some
headlines, but as a way of introducing civil marriages (which was the
only concrete goal the sponsors seemed to be sure of) it so confused and
complicated the issue that it was much less likely to succeed than some
real political movement to address merely the one law.
Litigation ond Legitimation
But worse than merely dissipating the resources of a political move-
ment, constitutionalization can actually serve to defeat it by legitimat-
ing the policy opposed. This, in fact, is one of the most familiar results
of legal politics. Both because of their legitimacy problems and because
156 See supra n. 71.
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of the usually limited nature of disagreements between judicial and
governmental elites, constitutional courts tend to avoid direct confron-
tations and to limit themselves to symbolic ones. This phenomenon has
been noticed in Israel as well. A case in point is the treatment of the
Arab residents of the territories occupied by Israel since 1967. A study
by Ronen Shamir found that (despite the occurrence of such "landmark
cases" as Elon Moreh), of the sixty-five Arab petitions from the Terri-
tories adjudicated by the Supreme Court between 1967 and 1986, only
five were upheld; in other words, the government won sixty out of sixty-
five. 157 According to Shamir, "the significance of these landmark cases
was primarily symbolic rather than substantive. The long-range out-
come of these decisions legitimized governmental policies". 58 The Elon
Moreh case itself, by emphasizing private property rights, actually
legitimated the vast majority of seizures that could be characterized as
not being about private property: "Thus, in its isolated and well-differ-
entiated decision, the court established new limitations on the ability of
future petitioners to resist land seizures and provided a sounder legal
basis for future takeovers". 59 In fact, it is possible to argue that the
constitutionalization process itself, coming as it did during the period
of the Intifada, was partially an attempt to legitimize Israel's whole
occupation policy in the face of blistering world criticism.
16 0
Now others have disputed the claim that the primary effect of the
court's interventions in the Occupied Territories was legitimation. For
example Asher Maoz:
The role judicial review plays in guaranteeing the rights of the
inhabitants of the occupied territories cannot be measured in statis-
157 Ronen Shamir, "'Landmark Cases' and the Reproduction of Legitimacy: The Case of
Israel's High Court of Justice", (1990) 24 Law and Society R. 781.
158 Ibid., at 786.
159 Ibid., at 789. I was informed by a member of the Dwaiket clan (though I cannot
confirm this) that even the land in dispute in the Elon Moreh case was ultimately
lost in a subsequent expropriation by the Israeli government for which the courts
afforded no relief. This phenomenon is very old. Douglas Hay, in his justly famous
study of the death penalty in 18th century England, noted how just one case of the
execution of a nobleman served to legitimate the vast number of executions of poor
people for a century: Douglas Hay, "Property, authority and the Criminal Law", in
D. Hay, et al., eds., Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth Century
England (Allen Lane, 1975).
160 I owe this point to David Kretzmer who made it forcefully when he commented on
this paper in its original version.
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tics alone. The mere possibility that their actions may be subject to
judicial review necessarily influences the security authorities in
choosing the measures they take vis-b-vis the population in the
territories. Also, a substantial proportion of petitions originating
there lead to out-of-court settlements, thus distorting the true pic-
ture of successful applications to the Court as expressed in formal
judgments.
161
This seems, however, to be pure speculation and it is hard to see why
the side with the 92% winning record in court would be more willing to
make concessions in anticipation of litigation than the side that almost
always loses. Maoz, too, seems to rely mainly on the symbolic effect:
Above all, the value of this unprecedented process of subjecting the
military governor's actions to judicial review should not be underes-
timated.
162
Precisely the same debates have taken place around the question of
repression, for instance the case of "moderate physical pressure" which
the Israeli judiciary approved in limited form and simultaneously sub-
jected to judicial review. While providing a forum for detainees to
complain that the limits have been exceeded, the Court has yet to
intervene on the side of a Palestinian complainant. 163 Critics have been
caught between being relieved that a formerly dark practice is under
supervision and being disgusted that "the respectable robe of the Su-
preme Court is waving above the interrogation cells":
On one level the bureaucratization of the process should be wel-
comed: the Palestinian detainee is no longer a victim of his interro-
gator's whims and perversions. But only a heart of stone can be
oblivious to the horrifying aspect of the change: acts of torture and
humiliation that were previously kept in the dark of the investigating
rooms have been brought out into the light of day as legitimate
means, just like prison or community service.'6
161 Maoz, supra n. 117, at 49.
162 Ibid.
163 Until September 1999. See below.
164 Gideon Levy, Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), January 25, 1998, at 6.
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The evidence cited earlier of 85% of Palestinians detained being
subjected to torture suggests that the Court's intervention has in no way
reduced the practice, and may even have increased it; at most it might
be said that it has helped to keep it within the delineated bounds of
severity. In other words, court intervention has likely not reduced the
use, but only the abuse of the practice. This is consistent with procedural
interventions by courts elsewhere. The procedural rights granted refu-
gee applicants by the constitutional courts of the wealthy countries
evidently have not raised the social status of refugees because they have
not prevented these countries from sealing their borders, even if they
have had to amend the constitution to do so. It is to be noted that the
required majority for constitutional amendment in France and Ger-
many (two-thirds) was considerably higher than Israel's fifty-percent-
plus-one formula, but there was no difficulty at all in overcoming it.
165
The procedural interventions of the United States Supreme Court are
world famous, but the country also holds the West's title for the highest
rate of imprisonment and boasts a death penalty that executes about
seventy prisoners a year, with blacks over-represented by more than
400% among those executed. Constitutional due process has lead to
record levels of punishment in Italy and in Canada. 166 An example from
Canada shows how the phenomenon works. After the Second World War
there was a major movement against the death penalty, but the govern-
ment would only go so far as to remove the death penalty from certain
forms of murder, leaving it in place for others. However, it added an
amendment for the remaining capital crimes that there would be an
automatic appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. No doubt for sup-
porters of the death penalty this was seen as progress, a way of ensuring
that only those whose execution was approved by the highest court
would be executed. But for opponents of the death penalty it was only
a way of perpetuating it by making people feel better about it. 167 The
165 Mandel, supra n. 3, at 256; supra n. 1.
166 Michael Mandel,"Legal Politics Italian Style" in C. Neal Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder,
eds., The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New York University Press, 1995) 261,
at 276-279; supra n. 3, at 220-228.
167 Mandel, supra n. 3, at 223.
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court is the "good cop" to the government's "bad cop", but like the cops
themselves, these are just different means to the same end. '6
The idea is that though the form of the policy changes, its substance
does not. Hence the legal philosopher's insistence on the distinction
between "principle" (form) and "policy" (substance).1 69 The result is to
168 On September 7, 1999, the Supreme Court issued is decision in the torture case,
ruling illegal the investigative techniques that had been authorized by the Landau
Commission 12 years earlier. The Shin Bet declared that it would order an immediate
halt to he condemned practices, which had been routine up to then. A good, demo-
cratic result, no question about it. Should we chalk one up for the constitutional
revolution? There are several reasons why we should not. In the first place, the court
ruled solely on the formal question of whether the practice was authorized by
ordinary law. In finding it was not, the court underlined the responsibility and power
of the Knesset to legislate. Nor did it set any limits on the nature of a new torture
law, besides dutifully pointing out that any law would have to comply with the
(vague) provisions of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (unless of course these
were overridden by the Knesset). The debate immediately started, with all sides,
including the government, making their proposals for a new torture law to authorize
what the security forces were claiming was necessary to fight terrorism. So to those
who praised the court's "sense of justice and courage" (Meron Benvenisti), others
responded more accurately that the decision was an "evasion" and "an attempt to
shirk responsibility" (Dan Margalit). The court's failure to set real limits on torture
must be placed in the timidity/ineffectiveness category discussed in the text. And
since the decision did no order anything but a formal change, it is difficult to avoid
the conclusion that the court's main goal - hard on the heels of the United Nations'
condemnation of Israel's investigative practices - was not to stop torture but rather
to legitimate it, as well as the State and the court itself in the eyes of the world.
Finally, how can we ignore the court's years-long delay in condemning what had
always been, in its now unanimous opinion, an illegal practice? In the words of one
critic "Why has something that was legal up until a few days ago suddenly become
illegal?" (Israel Harel). Even one of the court's strongest supporters (Ze'ev Segal)
called the decision "an act of repentance". Journalist Orit Shohat put it quite
eloquently: "Those very same judges who have just ruled that the torture methods
must be stopped immediately heard horror stories year after year in the courtroom
but, up until recently, did not seem to regard the issue as terribly urgent ... How do
they justify to themselves the enormous amount of time it took before they decided
to put an end to something that they regarded as clearly illegal?" So a balance sheet
of the period from Justice Landau to the present would show judicial legitimation of
routine torture for about twelve years, from which would be subtracted only the
period of time it takes to put a new law in place. Even on the best-case scenario (the
failure to enact a new law or, perhaps, some future constitutional ruling with teeth)
it is going to take a long time before the damage already done by the court is ever
erased. See Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), September 8-10, 1999, for the quotes in this footnote.
169 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 1977) 85-92.
ISRAEL LAW REVIEW
make us feel better about the policy, so it can continue on a more secure
basis. This holds equally for bad policies and good ones, but here we are
concerned with bad policies because we are talking about the court as
a remedy for an undemocratic legislature. Court supervision has even
been known to prop up whole systems, for instance the Italian Court,
whose rather moderate reformism (mixed with some very anti-demo-
cratic decisions) can be argued to have contributed to the maintenance
of a stagnant political status quo for most of the second half of the
twentieth century. 10 Often the legitimizing form is purely procedural,
and often this depends on sheer access to the court itself (even where
this is usually unsuccessful) which becomes the legitimator of an oth-
erwise repressive policy - something which obviously suits the legal
profession and the Court so well that it starts to resemble the mobster's
"piece of the action" more than a means of democratic opposition. It is
not a big step from sheer access to the court to mere representation on
it as legitimator, namely as a substitute for equality of treatment. The
world witnessed such an exercise in the United States where the ap-
pointment of a conservative black man to the bench was a substitute for
real equality for blacks in everyday life.171 In Israel, it took fifty years
for the Supreme Court to agree to the appointment of its first Arab
judge. This left Arabs still way under-represented on the Supreme
Court, though less so than on the courts in general. 172 But the main point
is that it cannot seriously be thought that this will change the substance
of what the court decides, especially since the Court could not bring
itself to make this appointment without putting the judge in question
on probation for a year.
1 73
One way of looking at the legitimation effect is to take seriously
Justice Barak's notion ofjudicial review as a "non-conventional weapon".
He has been criticized by the Right for the unfairness of using such a
weapon in the secular cause:
The essence of the problem lies in the court's transformation, when
sitting as the High Court of Justice, into the "non-conventional
170 Mandel, supra n. 165.
171 Mandel, supra n. 3, at 54.
172 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), April 12, 1998, at 2. Arabs constitute 18% of the citizens of Israel
and 4.5% of all its judges. There are fourteen judges on the Supreme Court.
173 Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), March 22, 1998, at 3.
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weapon" of the secular side in its dispute with the religious public.
"Non-conventional" in the sense that the court's status turns its
judgments into knockout blows that decide debates which, by their
character, and by the custom in Israel, should be decided in the broad
public arena.
17 4
But whether the Right's criticism is just or not, another well-known
drawback of non-conventional weapons is their tendency, one way or
another, to destroy even those who try to make use of them. In other
words, if law, like war, is "politics by other means' 75 we should never
underestimate the difference a change in means can make.
The Question of Property
So far, our analysis has led us to the conclusion that, even on the best-
case scenario - for which, naturally, there is no guarantee - the
tendency ofjudicial review in Israel, as elsewhere, is to contribute to the
decline in the "democracy of ends" on which it stakes its claim to
democratic legitimacy. Even if the Israeli Supreme Court holds to the
path it has been travelling pretty much throughout its existence, mod-
erately to the democratic side of government and almost never on the
undemocratic side, it will still effectively legitimate the anti-democratic
policies that are pursued there, even while maintaining its own rela-
tively democratic reputation. This is because its disagreements will be
limited to rare, symbolic and procedural ones.
This is another way of saying that the democracy of ends cannot be
detached from the democracy of means. Prior to the advent of judicial
review, democratic theory always assumed that procedures and results
were linked. The battle for universal suffrage (in favour of "one person,
one vote" and against "one dollar, one vote") was always fought on both
sides - propertied and propertyless alike - on the assumption that it
would make a difference in the result. And this assumption has found
plenty of corroboration in the twentieth century, from the triumphs of
the world's labour movements to the violent reactionary storms un-
174 Yair Sheleg, "The High Court and a constitution", Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), June 14, 1998,
at 6.
175 Mandel, supra n. 3, at xi.
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leashed against them. The historical record shows that it was the
tendency of universal suffrage to lead to revolutionary differences in
result that in fact called forth the invention of judicial review - as an
antidote - to protect oligarchy from democracy by building up consti-
tutional walls around the newly democratic governments. 1 76 The major-
ity rule lately deprecated as mere "statistical democracy" is only the
practical expression of the deeply egalitarian principle of "one person,
one vote". Courts understand this clearly enough when it comes to their
own affairs, because, like the rest of us, when they cannot agree on the
result, they take a vote and go with what the majority thinks is right.
That's how equals decide things. The re-definition of democracy as
detached from majority rule can only be explained as a desperate
attempt to have it both ways: to deny democracy in practice while
vowing undying devotion to it in theory.
Now lawyers and judges in any society are a propertied elite and that
is why they have always been counted upon to protect property from
democracy. As the early Soviet theorist Pashukanis wrote, however
independent they might be of the state, they are not independent of the
propertied classes.'7 7 Israel is no different in this regard, so where
property is at stake it is hard to understand why a majority of these
elites should be thought better at defining democratic values than a
majority of the people themselves. If I were a statistician, I would know
how to put this in terms of samples sizes and such like.
But yet another peculiarity of legal politics in Israel is that, at least
so far, questions of class and property have taken a back seat to other
questions of great importance: peace, security, race, ethnicity, religion
and gender. What does this do to the strong property thesis advanced
in the beginning of the paper, namely that modern constitutionalism is
meant to protect the oligarchy of property from the threat of democracy?
Clearly this was the inspiration in Israel as well, but if the proof of the
pudding is in the eating, how can it be said to have been the practice
when apparently non-class questions have dominated?
Interestingly enough, all of the decisions under the Basic Laws - as
opposed to the traditional "rule of law" questions - have indeed con-
cerned economic rights. The landmark United Mizrahi Bank case of
176 Mandel, supra n. 1.
177 Evgeny B. Pashukanis, Law and Marxism:A General Theory (Pluto Press, 1989) 149,
n. 21.
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November 1995 was a challenge by a creditor bank to a law which, in
the interest of solving the financial crisis in the moshavim (cooperative
farms) provided a mechanism for reducing, restructuring or even can-
celling part of the debts owing, depending on the ability to pay of the
debtor. The lower court had struck this down as an interference with
property rights under Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Protec-
tion of the rights of rich creditors had been the first mission of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the early 19th century, and, had
the Supreme Court upheld this decision, it would have been in the
classic mould of protecting economic power from democracy. However,
while the Court took the opportunity to establish once and for all the
binding nature of the Basic Laws and to lay down an expansive theory
of judicial review, it did not strike down the law. Not that it had
anything against property rights, which Justice Barak praised in the
most idealistic terms imaginable:
The right to property is the cornerstone of the liberal system. It
occupies a central place in liberal ideology, as security for the exist-
ence of other rights ... Indeed the right to property promises the
individual financial freedom. It enables interpersonal cooperation. It
enables a person to activate the autonomy of his personal will.
Thence arises the connection between the protection of property and
the protection of human dignity.
178
Of course, when property is unequally held, as it always is in "the
liberal system", and as it increasingly egregiously is in Israel, property
rights can only increase the human freedom of some at the expense of
the human freedom of others. 17 9 Nothing could be more obvious when the
conflict is between debtor and creditor, as it was in United Mizrahi Bank
itself.
On the other hand, Judge Barak recognized the importance and
worthiness of the interference with property in the case at hand:
The purpose is to ensure the rehabilitation of certain debtors and to
prevent the collapse of their life's work ... This purpose is an impor-
178 United Bank Mizrahi, supra n. 12, at 133-134.
179 Gerald Cohen, "Capitalism, Freedom and the Proletariat", in Alan Ryan, ed., The
Idea of Freedom: Essays in Honour of Isaiah Berlin (Oxford University Press, 1979).
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tant social goal ... It expresses the policy of the welfare state ... In the
end I am convinced that this is a borderline case that falls within that
area permitting the lawmaker to design a legislative arrangement at
its discretion ... In light of the fitting purpose - which deals with
solving the deep crisis into which the agricultural sector has fallen
- it seems to me that the means chosen by the legislature in the
Amended Sector Law do harm creditors, but this harm does not
exceed the extent necessary. I have not found that it goes beyond the
domain left within the discretion of the legislature in a democratic
society ... 180
It could have been a lot worse. Still, the characterization of a case like
this as "borderline" is certainly ominous, given the high stakes and the
imbalance of power between the bankers and the farmers. It bears
underlining that it was only the existence of the Basic Law that put the
relief plan at risk in the first place.
When, in 1997, the Supreme Court finally drew blood and struck a
portion of a law, it was also an economic rights case, but one of monu-
mental triviality. A group of stock-brokers complained that the transi-
tional provisions of the new law to regulate the stock market exempted
those with seven years of experience from having to take competency
tests, but left it to the Securities Commission's discretion whether those
with less than seven years experience would have to take the tests. The
court jumped to the defence of this downtrodden group (stock-brokers
with less than seven years experience) and, after balancing their human
dignity against the grave public interest in protecting the rich who play
the stock market from incompetent brokers, removed the yoke of oppres-
sion and fearlessly declared that seven years was too long! Human
dignity would allow no more than four (or maybe five) years of bondage,
or maybe it would be content with a sliding scale of tests according to
experience.1
8 1
But these cases are only suggestive; they are far too marginal to the
issues at the heart of the constitutional revolution to prove a theory
with. What can be said of all those issues that have occupied the Court
in the rule of law area - the conflicts over sexual equality, racial and
180 United Mizrahi Bank, supra n. 12, at 155, 159.
181 Association of Investment Management in Israel, supra n. 14.
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ethnic equality, and religious pluralism? What have they got to do with
class and property?
Of course, class strongly informs these other conflicts, in the sense
that there are clear class dimensions to conflicts that are fought out as
secular/religious, Ashkenazi/Sephardi, Jew/Arab and male/female - all
of these are also battles between economic unequals. Even peace and
war have their class dimensions as a not untypical alliance between the
parties of business and the poor faces off against the parties of organized
labour, professionals and intellectuals. Furthermore, class inequality in
Israel is growing lock step with the increasing reign of the free market,
a matter as high on the agenda of the sponsors of the "constitutional
revolution" as constitutional reform.
8 2
But what is the relation of the legal revolution to these questions?
In some cases it is only too obvious, as when the court legitimates the
material inequality of the Arabs and their repression by the Jews. But
what about sexual equality and religious pluralism? This is not an easy
question, but I would answer it this way: in these cases the court has
been basically defending elite values, the values of Israel's WASP prop-
ertied class that is so well-represented in the court. But, it might be
asked in return, are not these values also more democratic? And the
answer would have to be yes, but only a qualified yes - yes in a strictly
limited bourgeois sense. Non-discrimination according to sex is not
inconsistent with discrimination according to class; in fact it is a re-
quirement of it. And it is also a fact that the court's decisions on women's
equality have all been decisions that have benefitted women precisely
according to their class. While the number of women directors of public
companies increased in the mid-nineties (following judicial initiatives
which followed legislative ones), overall wage and employment disparity
did not.183 The great mass of women who are not the elite are affected
only negatively, that is by the increasing inequality in general - which
includes inequality between women.
182 Arian, supra n. 31, at 70-71.
183 Shachar Goldman, "The Israeli Supreme Court as a social change agent, its actual
role and possible implications on democratic values: the case of equality between
women and men" (unpublished paper in the possession of the author), citing Women's
Lobby in Israel, Women in Israel: Information and Data (Jerusalem, 1997) 24; The
Comptroller of State of Israel, An Account on Nomination of Directors to Governmen-




As for religious pluralism, even the decision on the importation of
non-kosher meat was a commercial rights decision in which the right to
do business was put at the top of the list of fundamental human rights;
84
not only that, it was a case that arose as the very result of the priva-
tization of the importation of meat, previously a government monopoly.
In fact, it is a proven, insidious tendency of legal politics to confuse
human rights with economic rights, indeed to transform the latter into
the former - or at least to make the equation seem natural - by
disguising their economic nature: the fact that they can only be exercised
according to the economic power of the right holder. This phenomenon
has already begun to be noticed by Israeli critics:
In Israel, freedom is not perceived in terms of individual rights or of
man's liberation from superstition, but rather as undisturbed control
of our private property. 8 5
A useful example of the way this happens is the question of busi-
nesses opening on Shabbat, a central battleground in the war between
secular and religious, Sephardi and Ashkenazi, Left and Right. When
I gave this paper in Jerusalem, my co-panelist and Canadian colleague
Lorraine Weinrib used this example to show how effective the Canadian
Charter of Rights was in the struggle for religious freedom. And, indeed,
this was the way the question of Sabbath opening was litigated in
Canada (though naturally the Sabbath in question was Sunday).184 The
Supreme Court held that the freedom of religion of a drug store that
worshipped only the Almighty Dollar and wanted to open seven days a
week was infringed by a law that required it to close on Sundays. Now
the stores are always open and the streets are happily clogged with
traffic, Sunday and all the other days of the week. Who opposed this
decision? The Left. Why? Because they knew that Sunday shopping also
meant Sunday working, in other words one less day off, or at least one
more day of work on the bargaining table. Who supported the decision?
Business. Why? Because they knew that if they could do business on
Sunday, they could make that much more money, but that if they had
184 Meatrael v. Rabin (1992) supra n. 7.
185 Ze'ev Sternhell, "Clinging to the rabbi's coattails", Ha'aretz (Eng. ed.), April 10, 1998,
at 7.
186 Mandel, supra n. 3, at 313-327.
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to close, then maybe people would find some other way of enjoying
themselves rather than spending money, maybe reading instead of
buying books, listening to music instead of buying records, or maybe
going for a stroll instead of going "recreational shopping". In France and
Italy, the Left is fighting for a thirty-five hour week, to fight unemploy-
ment from the point of view of workers; but in Israel, the Left has risen
to the religious bait and is effectively fighting for a longer working week.
If the debate is fought in the constitutional terms of religious freedom,
which treats commercial freedom as the paradigm case, and not in terms
of the modest secular good of a universal day off (with an extra day off
for shopping if need be), this seems inevitable.
Let me end this long piece with a true parable. When in Jerusalem,
we like to run in Gan Sacher a few times a week. I was telling someone
how much I love the view as you enter the park from the east by the
Monastery of the Cross, but that it was spoiled for me by ... and before
I could finish the person quickly supplied "the Knesset?" and I said, "No,
I kind of like the Knesset. It's the ugly hotel towering above everything
that spoils the view for me". Visitors to the Supreme Court's new
building are inevitably told that it was built to be higher than the
Knesset to symbolize that the law is above politics, but nobody ever
points out that the Holiday Inn Crown Plaza towers over both of them.
The Supreme Court building, opened in the very year of the "constitu-
tional revolution" itself, is, indeed, a magnificent architectural achieve-
ment. It was built with lavish private funding from the Rothschild
Foundation precisely to coincide with the movement for the constitu-
tion, which required a great leap upward in status for the Court in order
to succeed. But, the way things stand, height-wise at least, it is as if the
real authority lay with the international investors who paid for the
hotel, and as if the Supreme Court, splendid above the Knesset, were
there to make this ugly power invisible, if not to keep watch over the
Knesset for it.
